
~ ifBimii-™™-'"-'' 



w^iMliL... 




Copyright N^_ 



CDEXRIGHT OEPOSm 



ESSENTIALS OF 
PSYCH OLOGY 



BY 

GEORGE A. DEGLMAN, S. J., Ph. D. 

Head of the Department of Philosophy 

Marquette University 



Printed as Manuscript 



Marquette University Press 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 

1921. 






Copyright, 1921, 
By Marquette University. 



SEP 23 B2i 



©CI.A624511 



to 



INTRODUCTION 

Psychology is that section of philosophy which 
considers the soul. The soul, in its most general 
sense, denotes that which makes a being live; it 
is the first principle of life in a living being. 

If we regard only the etymology of the word, 
the object of psychology should be co-extensive 
with all living beings, vegetable and animal as 
well as man. Custom, however, has restricted it 
at the present day, so that psychology is generally 
limited to the study of man. Accepting this re- 
striction, we know from the direct testimony of 
consciousness that man who is a living, sentient 
and rational being is one being. It is the man 
who feels and thinks, not his soul only, just as 
it is the man and not his body only that works 
when his hands are in motion. Hence we must 
consider the complete human nature as the seat 
of life, sensation and thought, and look upon the 
soul as the first principle in virtue of which we 
are alive, sentient and capable of rational thought. 

To include all living beings we may define 
psychology as the science of the vital principle 
which intrinsically constitutes living beings. 

The proper' object of psychology, then, is the 
vital principle inasmucVi as it is the constituent 
part of the organized body, and we may be war- 
ranted in extending our study to the various 
forms of life — organic life, sentient life, and 
rational life. 



PART I 
ORGANIC OR VEGETATIVE LIFE 



CHAPTER I 

IDEA OF LIFE IN GENERAL. 

Thesis 1 — Life Consists in the Poiver of An Agent 
to Perfect Itself by Immanent Activity. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Life and move- 
ment are so intimately associated in the popular 
mind that the absence of all movement is con- 
sidered an infallible sign of death. However, not 
every kind of movement means life, but only that 
movement which is immanent, whose principle is 
intrinsic to the agent. Hence life may be defined 
as the power of an agent to perfect itself by im- 
manent activity, or, the power of self -movement. 

2. Life, we say, consists in' the power, etc. 
Life may be considered in the first place as em- 
bracing the vital faculties and their substantial 
principle, and, secondly, as immanent or vital 
action. The vital faculties are the proximate prin- 
ciple of immanent activity, whilst the vital prin- 
ciple is the ultimate principle. 

We say that life consists in the poiver, etc., be- 
cause actual immanent action is not absolutely 
necessary for the essence of life. Facts prove 
that there is latent life in seeds, microbes, or in 
dried-up spores of certain plants. As long as 
they remain in this state such beings are only 



6 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

potentially alive, they are but machines ready 
for action. For them to become actually alive 
certain material conditions are necessary, such as 
moisture, certain degrees of heat, etc. 

We say, moreover, that life consists in the 
power of immanent activity. Here lies the es- 
sential difference between living and non-living 
beings. Immanent activity is action by which a 
being moves itself. It implies two things : 

(a) that the action proceeds from a principle 

intrinsic to the agent; 

(b) that the action terminates in the agent. 
Hence, the living being is both the principle 

and the term of the action. Therefore, every 
action that passes over to the perfection of an- 
other being is non-vital because it is transitive. 

We say in so far as it is "transitive," since an 
action which is immanent may at the same time 
produce an effect outside of the agent; e. g. the 
action of a sculptor in the use of a chisel. 

Non-living beings merely have the capacity of 
passive motion, that is, the power of being moved. 

It must also be observed that the words "move- 
ment" and "move," in the present connection, in- 
clude every kind of internal activity, vegetative, 
sentient and rational, not only local movement. 

Life consists in the power of an agent to per- 
fect itself, etc. Since the effect of immanent ac- 
tivity remains within the agent and consists in 
the exercise of its faculties, it is clear that imma- 
nent activity perfects the agent. 

By agent we mean created agents. Our defin- 
ition of life cannot apply to God, since life in God 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 7 

is without any imperfection and implies the ful- 
ness of perfection. 

Note — The thesis is an explanatory one and 
consequently cannot be strictly demonstrated. 
Proof must be furnished whenever we apply the 
definition to a particular class of beings. How- 
ever, it must be noted that the definition is not 
an "a priori" one ; it is based on observed facts. 

We may show the correctness of the definition 
in the following way : 

That definition of life is correct which con- 
tains those essential notes whose presence con- 
stitutes a being a living being and whose absence 
classifies it as non-living. 

Now the power of immanent activity contains 
these notes. Therefore. 

To illustrate : All admit that animals are living 
beings. Now, as soon as an animal is capable of 
exercising immanent activity it lives, and it con- 
tinues to live so long as it has this power. 

THE VITAL PRINCIPL;E 

A. Existence of the Vital Principle 

Thesis 2 — In All Living Beings a Vital Principle 
Must Be Admitted Which Is Essentially Differ- 
ent From the Forces of Matter. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Materialists 
derive all vital activity from the forces of inan- 
imate matter. They endeavor to explain the phe- 
nomena of life along mechanical lines, by various 
vibratory motions of the atoms, or by the inter- 
play of physico-chemical forces ; so Tyndall, Hux- 



8 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ley, Spencer, Vogt, Du Bols Reymond, Haeckel, 
and others. 

2. The Schoolmen, while contending that the 
vital principle is distinct from matter and its 
forces, do not by any means exclude the activity 
of the latter. They admit that the vegetative 
process in plants, animal and man, and the sen- 
sitive process in animal and man, largely depend 
on physical and chemical forces; but they rightly 
maintain that these forces are guided by the vital 
principle so that they may perform their proper 
activities. 

3. The vital principle is a substantial some- 
thing which by its presence in the an organism is 
the last source of the entire organization and of 
every vital activity. (Gruender.) 

4. Living beings are organized bodies; or, 
those bodies w^hich are composed of heterogenous 
parts so united that each part exercises its own 
proper function, yet dependent on the rest, and 
in such a manner as the well-being of the whole 
organism demands. 

5. Although the thesis is true also of man, yet 
we do not expressly speak of man here since we 
shall make the human soul the subject of a special 
treatise. 

6. By inorganic matter we mean dead matter. 
Proof — A vital principle, essentially different 

from the forces of inorganic matter, must be ad- 
mitted in those beings which manifest actions and 
properties essentially different from the actions 
and properties of inorganic matter. 

But living beings manifest such actions and 
properties. Therefore. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 9 

Proof of the Minor — 1. Living Beings Mani- 
fest Actions 

(a) There is an energy in living beings which 
enables them to evolve themselves into a complete 
organism from a tiny cell by means of assimila- 
tion of extraneous matter. 

This complex activity, however, is essentially 
different from the physico-chemical forces of in- 
organic matter. 

For the physico-chemical actions pass over to 
foreign subjects and do not begin and terminate 
in the agent, so as to enable it to grow from with- 
in and construct its own organism. 
- (b) In living beings by the same energy by 
which they grow into complex organisms, a proc- 
ess of metabolism — of waste and repair — goes on 
incessantly, and, as the one or the other is more 
active, we have growth or degeneration. 

This fact proves that there is a marvelous unity 
of direction in the various parts of the organism 
whereby the inferior functions are made sub- 
servient to the superior, and whereby all conspire 
to the one end of procuring the well-being of the 
individual and the preservation of the specific 
type. 

But, this unity and harmony cannot be ex- 
plained unless we admit in living beings a prin- 
ciple which controls these varies forces and di- 
rects them to their proper end. 

If this is not conceded, we cannot explain why 
living beings should be governed in their entire 
existence by laws peculiar to themselves, or why 
their actions and effects are admittedly different 
from those of non-living beings. 



10 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(c) Whenever the organism of a living being 
is turned aside from its natural condition by 
sickness or any external cause, it endeavors by an 
innate force to repair the injury inflicted and 
protect itself against agencies constantly work- 
ing towards its destruction. 

Now, such an effect cannot be attributed to 
physico-chemical forces because it is well known 
that inorganic beings are preserved by a state of 
changeless repose. 

Therefore this effect must be attributed to a 
principle essentially different, to an internal force 
which governs the stream of activities described 
as the phenomena of life. 

This force we call the vital principle. 

2. Living Beings Manifest Properties 

Living beings differ from inorganic beings : — 

(a) in Shape and Structure. 

Living beings have a determined shape vary- 
ing according to each specific type. 

Inorganic bodies have no determined shape, 
unless we except crystals. Even in the case of 
the latter there is a ' difference. The shape of 
crystals is angular whereas living beings, both 
in their complete organisms and in their several 
parts, are usually bounded by curved lines. 

Again, living beings are differentiated organ- 
isms ; whilst inorganic bodies are homogeneous. 

(b) In Origin. 

Living beings take their origin from living 
beings of the same specific type ; whilst inorganic 
bodies arise from chemical analysis or synthesis 
of bodies specifically different. 



ESSENTIALS OP PSYCHOLOGY 11 

(c) In Chemical Composition. 

All living beings are compounded from ele- 
ments which, in order to constitute the organism, 
are united into compounds quite peculiar to liv- 
ing beings. 

Though these compounds consist of the same 
elements as inorganic bodies, they have this pe- 
culiarity that they are of highly complex pro- 
portions. 

Moreover, scientists admit that protoplasm is 
so complex chemically as to defy complete an- 
alysis, although the most important constituents 
are few and when found in other chemical com- 
pounds are more readily analyzed. This is true 
even of dead protoplasm, 

(d) In Nutrition. 

Living beings have the power of assimilation, 
i. e., they manufacture proteids out of inorganic 
matter and elaborate foreign substances into their 
own. Living beings change constantly; there is 
a continual process of decay and repair. 

Inorganic matter, on the contrary, is stable and 
tends to constant stable equilibrium, 

(c) l7i Groivth. 

Living beings, after they have reached the 
proper perfection of their species, begin to decay 
from within and finally perish by disintegration 
into elements of inorganic matter. The whole' 
development of organic beings is a "progress 
towards death." 

Inorganic bodies of themselves have no limited 
or definite duration ; they change only when acted 
upon by external agents. 



12 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

B. The Vital Faculties, the Proximate 
Principles of Life. 

1. Idea of a Faculty. The vital principle is 
the first principle of life. However, in order to 
exercise its activities, it must be equipped with 
certain powers, which are called faculties. 

In general, a faculty is the 'proximate ground 
of some kind of activity. A vital faculty is one 
by which the agent can perform immanent ac- 
tions. 

2. Division of Vital Faculties. The vital fac- 
ulties are of two kinds : Organic and Non-Organic. 

(a) Organic faculties are those which exist 
in the animate composite and whose activities 
cannot be exercised without an organ; such are 
the senses. 

(b) Non-Organic faculties are those which 
exist not in the composite but in the soul alone, 
and, consequently, can exercise their activity with- 
out the concurrence of an organ; such are the 
intellect and will in man. 

3. Classification. The principle by which we 
may classify the faculties is not something in- 
trinsic to them but rather some sign by which the 
nature of the being is manifested. Hence, vital 
faculties are classified according to the nature of 
each activity and the objects towards which they 
tend. 

This proposition is proved thus: — 
All beings must possess those powers which 
are demanded by the end to which they are nat- 
urally directed. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 13 

Now, the vital faculties are by their nature 
directed to the exercise of diverse activities re- 
garding certain objects. 

Therefore, they must be such by their nature 
as these activities and their specific objects de- 
mand. 

Therefore, too, from these activities and proper 
objects we may recognize the essential difference 
between the vital faculties. 



14 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER II 
VEGETATIVE LIFE IN PLANTS 



A. Existence and Functions of Vegetative 
Life in Plants. 

Thesis 3 — Plants Exercise Vegetative Life Only. 
The Chief Functions of Vegetative Life Are Nu- 
t7'ition, Grovjth and Reproduction. 

Statement of the Question — 1. The lowest and 
most universal grade of life in the visible uni- 
verse is the vegetative. It is the lowest, because 
it is the least independent of matter in its func- 
tions. It is the most universal, because it is com- 
mon to plants, animal and man. 

2. Plants, as we take the term here, are all 
those living organisms which are commonly- 
judged to be purely vegetative, such as trees, 
flowers, etc. 

3. The chief functions of the vegetative life 
are nutrition, growth and reproduction. We say 
they are the chief functions, because they are di- 
rected not as a means to other functions, but be- 
cause of themselves they obtain their own proper 
end. 

Although nutrition is prerequisite to growth, 
and growth and nutrition to reproduction, yet 
each has its independent and proper end. For, 
nutrition continues even when the vegetal plant 
being has reached the proper perfection of bulk 
and shape, and growth and nutrition continues 
when reproduction has ceased. 

The complete and remote end, however, to 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 15 

which all vegetative activities are directed, is the 
development of the living organism to its proper 
perfection and the reproduction of the organism; 
this end is obtained by all three functions con- 
jointly. 

Nutrition is the function by which the living 
organism converts external substances into its 
own. This process implies various operations on 
the part of the living being: 

(a) Absorption of extraneous substances 
through roots, leaves, etc. 

(b) Preparation of the raw materials by va- 
rious elaborate chemical processes; 

(c) Circulation of the food thus elaborated 
throughout the organism. 

(d) Assimilation or conversion of the food 
into the living substance of the organism. This 
is strictly the act of nutrition or the vital act. We 
may designate the previous actions vital only in 
so far as they are accomplished under the influ- 
ence and direction of the living organism and for 
its benefit. 

Growth is that function by which the living 
being builds up its complete organic structure ac- 
cording to a definite morphological type out of 
the nutriment assimilated. 

Reproduction is that function by which the liv- 
ing organism produces from its living substance 
a germ, seed or part, capable of evolving itself 
into a new living organism similar in specific type 
to the parent plant. 

4. Opponents. Ambng the ancient philoso- 
phers many maintained the theory of Panpsy- 
chism, according to which everything in the 



16 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

world possesses some kind of cognitive life; Eni- 
pedocles, Thales, Parmenides, etc. 

Among modern philosophers Fechner, the 
father of modern psychology, defended cognitive 
life in plants. Fechner has adherents among 
other modern writers: cf. Titchener, Text Book, 
p. 451 ; Wundt-Titchener, Principles of Phys. 
Psychology, v. I, p. 31; Gruender, Psychology 
Without a Soul, chap. I. 

5. By sensation we understand that act by 
which material objects are vitally represented 
according to their sensible qualities — color, sound, 
taste, etc. 

Since all orders of animals below the anemone 
have no nervous system, sensation does not uni- 
versally depend on the nervous system. It must, 
therefore, be a property of protoplasm. 

6. Spontaneous Movement is that movement 
which is performed under the direction of the 
elicited appetitie, i. e., by the tendency towards 
the good as recognized by sense or intellect. 

Pa7't I — Plants Exercise Life. 

Proof — Life consists in immanent action, i. e., 
in action which begins and terminates in the 
agent. 

But, nutrition, growth and reproduction are 
actions which begin and terminate in the agent. 
Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — In nutrition extraneous 
materials are absorbed by the plant and con- 
verted into its substance by its own activity. 

In growth the plant, by its own energy, builds 
up a complete structure from the nutriment thus 
assimilated. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 17 

In reproduction the living organism produces 
from its substance a germ, seed or part, capable 
of evolving itself into a new living organism, 
similar in type to the parent plant. 

Part II — Plants Exercise Vegetative Life Only. 

Since there can be no question about intellectual 
life in plants, we prove our point by excluding 
sensitive life from plants. 

Proof — Plants do not possess sensitive life, if 
(a) they do not display sufficient signs of sen- 
sitive action; if (b) sensation would be useless 
to them; if (c) it would be harmful to them. 

But all this obtains. Therefore. 

The Major — If plants do not display signs of 
sensation, the assertion that they possess sensi- 
tive life is gratuitous. If sensation is useless or 
even harmful to plants, we have positive proof 
for our denial of sensitive life in plants. For, 
faculties are a necessary complement of nature; 
but a necessary complement of nature cannot be 
useless, much less harmful. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) The only signs by 
which we might judge that beings outside our- 
selves exercise sensation are: 

(aa) similar organs of sensation ; 

(bb) similar manner of action. 

But both these signs are wanting. 

All grant that no organs like ours are found in 
plants. This is further demonstrated by experi- 
ment. 

Besides, plants do not exercise any activity like 
ours in reference to sensitive life. For, when in- 
jured, they show no signs of repugnance, no 



18 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

feeling of anger, no emotion, no flight from 
danger. 

(b and c) Senses serve the being which has 
them to procure what is necessary for it, to re- 
move things harmful to it, to fly from danger, 
etc. 

But plants cannot have senses for this purpose. 

For, the necessary nourishment is freely fur- 
nished them through the roots and leaves. If the 
nutriment should fail them, they could not go to 
seek it, since they have not the power of spon- 
taneous local movement. 

Part III — The Chief Functions Are Nutrition, 
Growth and Reproduction. 

Proof — The object of vegetative life is the de- 
velopment and reproduction of the living being. 
Therefore, vegetative life must perform the vital 
functions necessary for the purpose. 

Now, by reproduction the living being acquires 
existence ; by growth it builds up its organic struc- 
ture; by nutrition the life of the living being is 
sustained. 

Moreover, these three functions are commonly 
enumerated by scientists as the principal func- 
tions of vegetative life. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 19 

B. Two Theories Regarding the Origin 
OF Life. 

I. SPONTANEOUS GENERATION. 

Thesis 4 — The Contention That Spontaneous Gen- 
e7'ation Takes Places at the Present Time or 
Occurred in the Past Is Not Borne Out by Anij 
Convincing Proof. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Spontaneous 
generation is the origin of a living being from 
lifeless matter. It is called abiogenesis to dis- 
tinguish it from biogenesis — the derivation of 
life from life. 

2. We consider spontaneous generation his- 
torically and from a twofold aspect : 

(a) a class of scientists of the present day 
claim that spontaneous generation takes place to- 
day. They base their contention on various ex- 
periments performed by themselves and others on 
organic substances. Among these are John But- 
ler Burke, Dr. E. Schaefer and others. 

In fact, the Materialists in general champion 
spontaneous generation for the double purpose 
of destroying the essential difference between liv- 
ing and non-living beings and giving an account 
of life without the action of the Creator. 

The question is not, however, of recent date 
only. About a century and a half ago it was held 
by some that spontaneous generation took place 
in putrified meat and the core of fruits. In the 
last century some endeavored to show that in- 
fusoria arose spontaneously from organic matter 
which belonged to living beings. 



20 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(b) Though the best scientific opinion today 
inclines to the belief that life comes from life, 
yet a further question may be asked: Where did 
the first Hving being come from? This world 
was once so hot that no living being could exist 
upon it. It cooled down and a time arrived when 
life could exist. Many men of science, unwilling 
to admit a Creator, have claimed that, although 
spontaneous generation does not occur at present, 
it must have taken place at some former period 
when the conditions of the earth were far differ- 
ent than they are now. Spencer puts the matter 
thus : "At a remote period of the past, when the 
temperature of the earth was much higher than 
at present, and other physical conditions were 
unlike those we know, inorganic matter, through 
successive complications, gave origin to organic 
matter." (Nineteenth Century, May 1886.) 

Huxley (Critiques and Addresses, p. 239) 
thought that, if it were given him to "look beyond 
the abyss of geological and recorded time" he 
might expect to "be witness of the evolution of 
living protoplasm from non-living matter." 

Spontaneous generation is, therefore, the log- 
ical postulate of materialistic evolution to account 
for the first origin of life on earth. 

We shall show in part one that the arguments 
advanced in favor of spontaneous generation at 
the present time do not prove. 

Proof — 1. Regarding the most recent experi- 
ments it must be observed that in most cases they 
are performed on germs which already possess 
the latent potency of life. Jacques Loeb per- 
formed experiments with the eggs of sea urchins. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 21 

What he accomplished, and others like him, was 
to artificially fertilize the eggs and advance the 
growth of the embryo to maturity. But from this 
it does not follow that he or others produced life 
from non-living matter. 

The fact is that some scientists vigorously op- 
pose the hasty conclusions drawn from these ex- 
periments. 

2. (a) In 1698 Redi, an Italian physician, 
showed that the maggots found in putrified meat 
had not arisen from the meat, but from the eggs 
of flies deposited thereon. He demonstrated the 
fact by covering the meat with gauze, and then 
no maggots appeared. 

(b) Antonio Vallisnieri (1661-1730), profess- 
or at Padua, discovered that the insects which in- 
fest our apples and pears are the larvae of a noc- 
turnal butterfly, which develop from an egg in- 
troduced into the incipient fruit at the time of 
blooming. 

(c) Forced to acknowledge their error in the 
field of entomology, the adherents of spontaneous 
generation retreated to the domain of the infinite- 
ly small animalculae. They pretended that in- 
fusoria and other microscopic animals spring 
spontaneously, if hot from inorganic matter, at 
least from organic elements which belong to living 
beings. 

In defense of this position they usually fall 
back upon the unknown. On account of the im- 
perfect means of investigation, they argue, it 
cannot be shown that reproduction does not take 
place in this way. 



22 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

It needed the labors of Pasteur to solve the 
question in a definite manner. The experiments 
of this famous savant began in 1858. In 1860 a 
prize was offered by the French Academy for the 
solution of the problem. Pasteur was provoked 
to activity by two zoologists, Professors Pouchet 
and Jolly, who upheld spontaneous generation in 
the case of infusoria in a sterilized liquid. Pas- 
teur demonstrated to his colleagues of the Acad- 
emy of Science that no organized being, however 
small, developed in a liquid when germs existing 
in the neighboring bodies are completely shut out. 

For this purpose it was sufficient to raise the 
•temperature of the liquid to 100 degrees R. and 
to cork the bottles which contain the liquid with 
gun-cotton. The latter substance, whilst permit- 
ting the outside air to penetrate during cooling, 
will keep back solid particles and with them the 
germs of living beings. Under these conditions, if 
the experiment is performed with some skill, not 
only no animalcula will develop in the liquid, but 
this liquid, though suitable for fermentation, will 
never change. 

3. From Authority. Note — Some of the au- 
thorities quoted are materialistic evolutionists 
who postulate spontaneous generation at least to 
explain the beginning of life on earth. 

(a) In 1870 Huxley, then president of the 
British Association, chose for the subject of his 
inaugural address "Biogenesis and Abiogenesis." 
After a careful examination of the case for each 
he declared that the former was victorious all 
along the line. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 23 

(b) Tyndall, in his Fragments of Science, 
after describing the experiments devised by him 
to test the matter, concludes : "The evidence in 
favor of spontaneous generation crumbles in the 
grasp of the competent enquirer." 

(c) Herbert Spencer has this to say in the 
Nineteenth Century, May 1886: "Biologists, in 
general, agree that in the present state of the 
world no such thing happens as the rise of a liv- 
ing creature out of non-living matter." 

(d) Charles Darwin, who is supposed to have 
upheld the fact of spontaneous generation, in a 
letter to D. Mackintosh, Feb. 28, 1882, wrote: 
"No evidence worth anything has as yet, in my 
opinion, been advanced in favor of a living being 
developed from inorganic matter." 

(e) Professor Virchow, materialist and evolu- 
tionist, said in regard of sponeaneous generation 
at the Munich Congress of 1877: "We must 
acknowledge that it (spontaneous generation) 
has not yet been proved. The proofs of it are 
still wanting." 

(f) Oskar Hertwig, the eminent director of 
the Berlin Institution for Biology and Anatomy, 
in his great work General Biology says: "In the 
existing condition of science there is little hope 
that any worker will be able to produce the 
simplest manifestation of life in any artificial 
way from non-living matter." 

(g) Professor B. Moore, whose knowledge of 
bio-chemistry renders him a peculiarly valuable 
witness, says: "The mode of production of liv- 
ing matter is characteristic, and cannot be 
brought about by the action solely of inorganic 



24 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

forms of energy; living matter is produced only 
by the action of other living matter upon the ma- 
terials and forms of energy of the non-living 
world." (Recent Advances in Physiology and 
Bio-Chemistry, 1906, p. 7.) 

In part two we prove that the contention of 
the materialistic evolutionists is not established, 
viz., thats pontaneous generation must be postu- 
lated to explain the first origin of life on earth. 

Proof — 1. It is quite certain that no human 
being has ever seen living matter produced from 
non-living matter. There were living beings in 
existence long before man came on earth, as geol- 
ogy and science testify. 

2. It is equally certain that we have no facts 
on which to base the theory that living beings 
"\\!e?e 'spbntaneoutely produced at some .former 
time. Hence the contention that the first living 
beings sprang from non-living matter, is a mere 
hypothesis and to be estimated accordingly. 

3. Those who have advanced this theory have 
not given and cannot give the slightest suggestion, 
as to how the transformation from non-life to 
life may have taken place, or under what con- 
ditions. Nor are we told why it is impossible to 
reproduce these conditions today in the chemical 
laboratory. 

4. Professor Virchow, says, in an address de- 
livered at Wiesbaden in 1887: "Nor have any 
fossil remains ever been found of which it could 
be ever likely that it belonged to a being the first 
of its kind, or produced by spontaneous genera- 
tion." 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 25 

Note — (Two points may be considered in this 
connection. 

1. May living matter come from non-living 
matter? Though production of living from non- 
living matter has not yet been demonstrated, it 
is not, therefore, impossible that it may some day 
fall to the lot of some fortunate enquirer to an- 
nounce such a discovery and to have the discovery 
recognized by science. 

Should this ever take place, it may be well to 
recall the fact that spontaneous generation was 
held by many, perhaps all the Fathers of the 
Church, and that St. Thomas himself maintained 
that if matter does produce life, it is because the 
Creator has given it the power to do so. 

What we claim is this, that if spontaneous gen- 
eration occurred or should occur, it does so and 
will do so at the will of the Creator and by a 
power which He gave to matter. We do not deny 
that that power may still be latent in non-living 
matter, and may even continually be manifested, 
though we are unable so far to recognize the fact. 

2. Whilst we allow all this, we must admit 
with all who studied the question that no approach 
has been made by any synthesis approaching that 
which would constitute living matter. 

II— EVOLUTION 

Note — On this subject confer authorities quoted 
at the end. 



26 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER III 

The Nature of the Vital Principle. 

Thesis 5 — The Vital Principle in Plants (and A72- 
imals) Is Entirely Dependent on Matter, Whose 
Substantial Form It Is. 

Statement of the Question — 1. A substantial 
form is one which determines the specific nature 
of a substance. When we say, therefore, that the 
vital principle in plants (and animals) is the sub- 
stantial form, we mean that the vital principle 
constitutes them in the species of living beings. 

2. We may classify the vital principles accord- 
ing to the manner in which they exist into two 
classes : 

(a) the one is immaterial and capable of ex- 
isting by itself; such is the human soul. 

(b) the other is material and incapable of 
existing by itself ; such are the vital principles in 
plants and animals. 

3. The words "entirely dependent on matter" 
do not mean that the vital principle in plants (and 
animals) is made of matter of quantitative di- 
mensions. The vital principle is, indeed, material, 
but at the same time it is materially simple — 
something like a physical energy exercising itself 
in a physical body. "Entire dependence on mat- 
ter" signifies that for its existence as well as for 
its operations the vital principle is intrinsically 
dependent on matter, so that it cannot exist as 
such apart from matter. It "is educed from mat- 
ter," as the Schoolmen express it. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 27 

In virtue of its nature the vital principle is 
destined to constitute in union with matter one 
complete being. Hence, outside that union the 
vital principle cannot exist. Therefore, too, it 
follows that the vital principle is not a complete 
substance. 

4. In this thesis we speak of plants (and an- 
imals) only; the nature of the human soul will 
be explained later. 

Part I — The Vital Principle in Plants (and an- 
imals) Is Entirely Dependent on Matter. 

Proof — The nature of a being is made known 
to us by its operations or activities; "operari se- 
quitur esse." 

Now, the operations or activities of the vegeta- 
tive (and sensitive) vital principle are entirely 
dependent on matter. 

Therefore the source-principle — the vital prin- 
ciple — is also entirely dependent on matter. 

The Major — The nature of the cause is recog- 
nized from its effects. Hence, the vital principle, 
which is the cause or source of vital activities, is 
dependent on matter or independent of it, when 
its activities are intrinsically dependent on or in- 
dependent of matter. 

Proof of the Minor — ^^Those activities are in- 
trinsically dependent on matter which cannot be 
performed without a material organ. 

But the activities of the vegetative (and sensi- 
tive) life cannot be performed without a material 
organ. Therefore. 

The activities of the vegetative life are nutri- 
tion, growth and reproduction. But these activ- 



28 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ities cannot be performed except in and through 
a material organ. 

(The same is true also of sensitive life.) 

Pm^t II — The Vital Principle is the Substantial 
Form. 

Proof — That is a substantial form which con- 
stitutes a being in a determined class, essentially- 
distinct from other beings. 

But, the vital principle in plants (and animals) 
constitutes them in the class of living beings. 
Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — In every being we dis- 
cover two elements one passive and determinable 
and common to all bodies, the other active and 
peculiar to each class of beings. 

Now, the vital principle in plants (and an- 
imals) cannot be the passive element, because to 
live means to act; nor can it be the element com- 
mon to all beings, otherwise all beings would live. 

Therefore, nothing remains except that it is 
the active, determining principle; that it is the 
substantial form. 

Cor. 1. Therefore the vital principle in plants 
(and animals) is not created but comes into being 
by reproduction. It is not created, because cre- 
ation is either the production of the whole sub- 
stance, complete in itself, or of an incomplete sub- 
stance, capable of existing by itself — such as the 
human soul. 

The vegetative (and sensitive) vital principle 
is neither a complete substance nor can it exist 
by itself. Hence it comes into being by genera- 
tion. For, substantial forms which are not created 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 29 

must be said to be the result of a change in mat- 
ter. Now, no other power can be assigned to 
effect this change except the power of genera- 
tion. Consequently, the term of generation in 
plants (and animals) is not the material vital 
principle, but the complete living composite. 

Cor. 2. Therefore the vital principle in plants 
(and animals) is not immortal. For, the vege- 
tative (and sensitive) vital principle exists only 
when united with matter for the purpose of con- 
stituting a living organism. Therefore, when the 
organism is broken up the vital principle, actually 
constituting the organism and entirely dependent 
on matter, perishes. 

Divisibility of the Vital Principle in Plants. 

The vital principle, though material, is not a 
substance of three dimensions. How is it di- 
visible, then ? A thing may be divided : 

(a) into essential or constitutive parts, as the 
body and soul in man ; 

(b) into quantitative or integral parts. 
Now, there are three views with regard to the 

divisibility of the vital principle in plants : 

1. Some deny the divisibility of the vital prin- 
ciple because it is not composed of integral parts. 
That some plants (and animals) should live after 
division is explained by them by the eduction of 
a new vital principle from matter. 

2. Others hold that the vital principle of in- 
ferior plants is divided at the division of the 
simpler organisms. But they maintain that the 
vital principle in higher organisms is indivisible. 

3. Others again maintain that all vital prin- 
ciples in plants (and animals) are divisible. In 



30 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the imperfect or lower forms of organisms the 
vital principle lives on after division; in the case 
of higher organisms it perishes. 

We favor this view for the following reasons : 

(a) the vital principle in lower forms of life 
is entirely dependent on matter, and therefore 
follows the nature of matter. Hence, when the 
organism is divided, the vital principle is "per 
accidens" also divided. 

(b) Lower organisms have a very limited va- 
riety of parts ; but higher organisms are more 
complex and require a more diversified structure. 
It is on account of the great diversity of parts and 
functions that these higher organisms cannot be 
so divided that each separated part may continue 
to live. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 31 

PART II 
SENSITIVE LIFE 



CHAPTER I 

SENSITIVE COGNITION. 

Article 1. Origin and Nature of Sensitive 
Cognition. 

Sensitive life presupposes vegetal life and is 
built upon it. 

There are various points of difference between 
sensitive and vegetative life: 

(a) "There is commonly a marked difference 
in general chemical composition between vege- 
tables and animals, even in their lowest forms; 
for while the former consist mainly of cellulose, 
a substance closely allied to starch and containing 
carbon, hydrogen and oxygen only, the latter are 
composed in great part of the three elements just 
named, together with a fourth, nitrogen ; the chief 
proximate principles formed from these being 
identical, or nearly so, with albumen." (Baker, 
Kirke's Handbook of Physiology, p. 4, ed. 9.) 

(b) The structure of the animal organism is 
such that vegetative life is not only subordinate 
to the sensitive, but by its union with the latter, 
preserves an organism fitted for sensation. 

(c) The animal is nourished with food drawn 
from the vegetable and animal kingdoms, whereas 
plants take their nourishment mostly from in- 
organic substances. 



32 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(d) The essential difference, however, be- 
tween the two grades of life lies in sensation. 

Sensation may be defined as the power of per- 
ceiving concrete material objects and striving 
after them when thus perceived. 

This definition includes the two classes of sen- 
sitive faculties — the cognitive and appetitive. 

Note — Though the faculties and activities of 
sensitive life are common to man and animal, yet, 
because we can know the inner nature of the lat- 
ter only by applying analogically to the animals 
the facts of our sensitive life, as attested by our 
consciousness, we are obliged to study sensitive 
life as we observe it in us and argue from the 
knowledge thus obtained to the nature of the sen- 
sitive life in animals. 

By the senses we mean the entire collection of 
faculties which are directed to the representation 
of the sensible qualities of material objects. 

The acts by which the sensitive faculties rep- 
resent their objects are called sensitive cognitions. 

Thesis 6 — Sensitive Cognition Is the Vital Rep- 
resentation of the Object by the Sensitive Fac- 
ulty, the Faculty Being Roused to Activity by 
the Cognitional Determinant. 

Statement of the Question — 1. The adequate 
or total cause of sensation is not found simply in 
the senses themselves. The senses are so many 
powers that by themselves are inactive. They 
have an aptitude to represent objects, but that 
aptitude remains in a potential state so long as it 
lacks an excitant other than itself to stimulate it. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 33 

For its transition from power to act the sense 
requires to receive an impression from without 
to arouse its activity and to determine it in some 
particular way. Hence, a sensory impression is 
the necessary complement of the sensitive power 
and the natural determining cause of the act of 
perception. We call this impression the Cog- 
nitional Determinant. 

We may define this cognitional determinant as 
a representative quality produced in the organic 
faculty by the sensible object, modifying and dis- 
posing the faculty to perform the act of cognition 
regarding that object. 

It is a quality because it is an accidental modi- 
fication of the faculty. It is said to be repre- 
sentative, because it manifests the object and 
takes the place of the object in its relation to the 
cognitive faculty. It is produced in the organic 
facidty; for it must be produced there where sen- 
sation takes place. Since the faculty is not of it- 
self determined to act, but is indifferent, the 
cognitional determinant modifies and disposes the 
faculty for perception. 

2. However, this cognitional determinant, is 
not the vital representation of the object. It is 
only a transient modification of the faculty, pre- 
requisite for the vital representation. The cog- 
nitional determinant is merely the last comple- 
ment of the faculty, by which the faculty is united 
with its object and its natural indifference is 
raised. 

When the modification has been effected, the 
senses, if in normal condition, must act and per- 
ceive the object. 



34 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

To bring about this latter effect, there is need 
of an active principle on the part of the faculty. 
Hence, given the modification on the part of the 
object, the sensitive act is elicited by the activity 
of the sentient subject, giving expression to the 
mental likeness or vital representation of the 
object. 

3. From what has been said we may define 
sensitive cognition as a vital reaction by tvhich 
the sensitive faculty in response to an impression 
or modification produced by some particular ob- 
ject, effects within itself a mental likeness, rep- 
resentation or image of the object. 

We say that sensitive cognition is a vital re- 
action; that is, an immanent action which does 
not emerge from the sentient faculty which pro- 
duces it. 

We must, however, bear in mind that sensitive 
cognition is at the same time, but under different 
aspects, immanent and transitive. The act itself 
is immanent, but inasmuch as it has reference to 
the object it is transitive. 

Part I — The Sensitive Faculty Is Roused to 
Action by the Cognitional Determinant. 

Proof — Experience and^ consciousness testify 
that the sensitive faculties are by their nature 
undetermined and indifferent with regard to 
their objects. On the other hand, knowledge is 
an immanent union of the subject knowing with 
the object known. 

In order, therefore, that this natural indiffer- 
ence may be removed and this immanent union 
be brought about, the object must be somehow 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 35 

united to the subject and, as it were, incorporated 
in it. 

Now it is evident that the material object, the 
thing in its physical reality, does not enter into 
the subject, or become immanently united to it. 

It must therefore be somehow replaced by a 
replica or resemblance. 

Hence an act of perception requires a sensory 
impression coming from the object. 

This impression produced in the sensitive fac- 
ulty by the object is called the cognitional de- 
terminant. 

Part II — Sensitive 'Cognition Is the Vital Rep- 
resentation of the Object by the Sensitive Faculty. 

Proof — Sensitive cognition is a vital act repre- 
senting a particular object. 

But sensitive cognition cannot be a vital act rep- 
resenting a particular object, unless the faculty 
of its own power and activity produces the rep- 
resentation of the object and is thus rendered con- 
formable to the object. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) To be a vital act, sen- 
sitive cognition must proceed from an active prin- 
ciple, intrinsic to the sentient being. 

(b) To represent a particular object, the 
principle from which the vital action proceeds 
must be assimilated to the object 'before actual 
cognition can take place. 

This, however, does not occur unless consequent 
upon the impression or modification of the fac- 
ulty by the object, the mental likeness of the ob- 
ject is expressed by the sensitive faculty. 

Note — ^^The cognitional determinant is a real co- 
principle in the act of cognition. 



36 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

In general that is a principle of action without 
which the faculty is not able to perform the action 
and which, moreover, exercises a real influence 
on the action itself. 

Now, the cognitional determinant does both 
these things. 

For, the cognitional determinant is necessary 
precisely because the sensitive faculty is not able 
of itself to issue in action ; it influences the action 
itself because it is due to the cognitional deter- 
minant that the sensitive faculty perceives this or 
that object. 

But it must be remarked that the cognitional 
determinant is not that which is perceived but 
that through which the sensitive faculty directly 
perceives the object. 

Article 2. The Principle of Sensitive 
Cognition. 

Thesis 7 — The Elicitive Principle of Serisitive 
Cognition Is Not the Soul Alone, Nor the Body 
Alone, but the Animated Composite Consisting 
of Body and Soul. 

Statement of the Question— 1. Some have 
maintained that sensation is an operation of the 
soul alone and that the body does not actively and 
efficiently concur in the act of sensation, but is 
only a prerequisite condition, inasmuch as the 
modifications which the external objects produce 
are recognized by the soul. 

According to this opinion sensation cannot be 
considered organic and material, but must neces- 
sarily be immaterial. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 37 

This doctrine is held by those who err about the 
substantial union between body and soul; Des- 
cartes, Leibnitz, Rosmini, etc. 

Materialists assert that sensation consists in 
certain activities of the nerves and a reaction in 
the brain. They argue that, since the impressions 
received in the sense organs from without are 
carried to the brain by means of the afferent 
nerves and there produce a reaction and molecular 
or some other type of motion, the phenomena 
must consist in these motions. 

All that can be inferred logically from these 
facts is, that such modifications and motions are 
conditions and concomitants of sensation. 

The correct doctrine is that of the Schoolmen 
who hold that the body and the soul, i. e., the 
animated composite is the adequate elicitive prin- 
ciple of sensation, although the soul is the radical 
or formal principle. 

We do not enter here into the question about 
the nature of the union of body and soul in man, 
nor do we explicitly regard how sensitive cog- 
nition takes place in the animal. 

We prove our thesis from the consciousness of 
our actions. 

Part I — The Elicitive Principle of Sensitive 
Cognition Is not the Soul Alone. 

Proof — 1. If the soul alone is the elicitive 
principle of sensitive cognition, it must perceive 
objects through impressions received by it from 
the body. 

But this is impossible. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — The body is extended; 
therefore it cannot act directly on the soul, which 



38 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

is a simple being. For the action of a body upon 
another body occurs by the application of its parts 
to parts of the body acted upon. Therefore. 

2. Sensation is attributed to the soul alone as 
to its adequate cause because there seems to be 
no proportion between sensitive operations and 
material forces. 

But the alleged reason is invalid. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — The reason advanced 
would be valid if material forces were said to be 
the complete and adequate cause of sensation. 

However, we maintain that the material forces 
are only a partial cause which, together with the 
soul and in virtue of the power derived from the 
soul, constitute the complete and adequate prin- 
ciple of sensation. 

Part II — Not the Body Alone. 

Proof — 1. The reasons advanced by Mate- 
rialists prove merely that the various nerve- 
motions are a condition of sensation, but they do 
not prove that sensation consists in these motions. 

2. If sensation consists merely in the vibratory 
or molecular motions of the nerves, the complex 
activities of animals can be explained according 
to mechanical laws. This, however, is absurd, as 
we shall prove. 

3. We proved before that the vital principle 
is "a reality. But if it is a reality it must also 
be a cause in the process of sensitive cognition. 

Part III — But in the Living Composite. 

Proof — 1. Neither the soul alone nor the body 
alone is the adequate elicitive principle of sensi- 
tive cognition; therefore it is the animated com- 
posite being, consisting of body and soul. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 39 

2. Consciousness testifies that sensations are 
extended. Therefore they must be received in an 
extended principle. 

But only the animated composite being is ex- 
tended. Therefore. 

Proof of the Major — 1. Sensation itself is 
quantitative. The properties of quantity are: 
(a) extension; (b) intensity, that is, it can be 
measured; (c) protensive magnitude, that is, it 
can be produced gradually. 

"Not only the object felt is something extended, 
but the very feeling is extended also. Thus, in 
the sensation of sight, the organ is a certain part 
of the body, the impression made upon the eye is 
extended, as experience shows, the sensation is 
also extended. In like manner the same can be 
said of the other senses." (Driscoll, The Soul, 
p. 197.) 

2. Consciousness testifies that sensation may 
be gradually produced, for example, from the hand 
to the wrist, to the arm, etc. 

3. Individual experience manifests that sensa- 
tions differ in intensity. We distinguish a differ- 
ence in intensity between the candle and an elec- 
tric light, and an attempt has been made to meas- 
ure this difference, (cf. Psycho-Physics.) 

Sensitive cognition requires not only an ex- 
tended principle but also a simple one, which 
manifests all the parts of the object perceived as 
one sensation. 

If this were not so, the sensitive faculty would 
perceive either single parts of the object, or each 
part of the sensitive faculty would apprehend the 
whole object. 



40 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

If the first would occur, we would hardly ever 
recognize the entire object; if the second, we 
would apprehend one and the same object a num- 
ber of times. 

Cor. 1. Therefore, the body is not, in the strict 
sense, the instrument of the soul in so far as the 
latter is sensitive. For, the soul does not move 
the body to action, but the soul and body concur 
as the complete and adequate principle of opera- 
tion. 

Cor. 2. Therefore in the soul after its separa- 
tion from the body sensitive life ceases, since the 
soul after its separation from the body does not 
retain the formal power of sentiency but only the 
radical power. 

Article 3. The Seat of External Sensation. 

Thesis 8 — The Seat of External Sensation Is Not 
in the Brain but in the Various Sense Organs. 

Statement of the Question — It is clear that the 
sensitive faculties are organic. In the present 
thesis we enquire into the question : Where does 
external sensation take place? 

Descartes and his followers thought that the 
soul was localized in the brain and that sensation 
took place in the brain. 

Modern physiologists hold a similar view. They 
contend that the external sense organs serve no 
other purpose than to receive impressions from 
without and transmit them to the brain by means 
of the nervous system. Consequently, the sensa- 
tion of sight, hearing, etc., occurs in the brain 
and not in the external sense organs. "In com- 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 41 

mon parlance we are said to see with the eye, hear 
with the ear, etc., but in reality these organs are 
only adapted to receive impressions which are 
conducted to the sensorium (or seat of sensation) 
through the optic and auditory nerves respective- 
ly, and there give rise to sensation." Baker, 
Kirke's Handbook of Physiology, p. 630. 

"The sensory organs are only instruments of 
the mind, which has its seat in the brain. The 
sensation itself evidently first takes place in the 
brain." Bernstein, The Five Senses, p. 2. 

According to the teaching of the Schoolmen, 
ancient smd modei'n, .'exteirnal ,sensation stakes 
place in the external sense organs, namely in the 
extremity of the nerves, the optic, the auditory, 
etc. This doctrine by no means denies that there 
is a necessary connection between the external 
senses and the brain. For, 

(a) The external sense organs receive im- 
pressions and impulses from without and convey 
them to the brain. 

(b) In the brain a reaction occurs. This re- 
action is necessary in order that sensitive cog- 
nition be elicited in the external sense-organs and 
be recognized by the central sense, which has its 
location in the brain. 

(c) This reaction is transmitted to the ex- 
ternal sense organs by the efferent nerves. 

Proof — 1. Consciousness bears witness that 
we see with the eye, hear with the ear, etc., and 
we have no experience whatever that these oper- 
ations take place in the brain. 

Now, this testimony of consciousness cannot be 
false. Therefore. 



42 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Proof of the Minor — This testimony of con- 
sciousness is constant, universal, and experienced 
in the normal condition of man. 

But to say that a consciousness which is con- 
stant and universal is deceptive and false, is to 
say that the natural powers of man are g-iven to 
deceive. But this cannot be maintained. 

2. The opinion of those who claim that sensa- 
tion takes place in the brain is contrary to certain 
well-established facts. 

(a) Physiologists tell us that the brain may be 
cut, punctured or cauterized, without the patient, 
retaining normal sensibility in other parts of the 
body, experiencing any pain. (Farges, L' ob- 
jectivite de la perception, p. 152.) 

(b) It has been proved by surgical operations 
and vivisectional experiments that the cerebral 
lobes and even either of the cerebral hemispheres 
can be removed in birds and some other animals 
without thereby destroying sensibility. (Foster, 
Textbook of Physiology, ed. 3, p. 550.) 

(c) Each sense organ is equipped with a pe- 
culiar and highly complex structure, suited for 
the special end of representing the object in men- 
tal likeness. 

Now, such a structure would be useless and 
superfluous for the mere perception of external 
impulses and their transmission to the brain. 

On the other hand, no organ adapted to external 
sensation is found in the brain; its structure is 
almost uniform throughout. 

(d) To take a concrete case: if the act of 
vision were to take place in the brain, the ter- 
minus of the act of seeing would be in the light 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 43 

entering through the eye, not in the place whence 
the Hght proceeds. 

This, however, is clearly against experience. 
Note — 1. Although external sensation is not 
performed in the brain, yet its purpose is ob- 
tained with the assistance of the brain. 

For, the external senses and their operations 
are directed to the welfare of the entire sensitive 
being. This welfare cannot be secured by ex- 
ternal sensation alone. By it the sensitive 
being perceives, indeed, the common and proper 
objects of the senses, but it does not perceive them 
as hurtful or useful ; to bring about the latter the 
brain is necessary. 

Note — 2. The manner in which the excitation 
of the external organs is conveyed to the brain 
is matter of conjecture. Some supposed it to be 
by way of molecular motion, others compared it 
to the action of electricity, others offer still dif- 
ferent explanations. 

Article 4. The Internal Senses. 
Thesis 9 — The Schoolmen Commonly Admit Fow 
Internal Senses. They Are the Common Sense, 
the Sensitive Memory, the Imagination, In- 
stinct. 

Statement of the Question — Opinions and doc- 
trines differ about the question of the internal 
senses. Aristotle and St. Thomas held them, and 
they are postulated by the older as well as the 
more modern Schoolmen. 

Opinions diverge chiefly with regard to the 
number of the internal senses, the nature of each, 
the organ, and the relation of the one to the 
others. 



44 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

A. The Common Sense. {Sensitive Con- 
sciousness.) 

1. Its Existence. "The soul does not perform 
sensations by its own essence. If this were the 
case, the soul would constantly perceive and act 
in a sensitive manner, since its essence is always 
actual. 

The postulate, therefore, is a fair one that there 
are internal senses besides external ones. 

Now, in order to perceive both internal and ex- 
ternal sensations as its own, to compare their ob- 
jects in a concrete, sensitive way, and to recog- 
nize their material differences, is an act at least 
inadequately distinct from the actions of the ex- 
ternal senses. 

For, the sensation itself, as a sensitive organic 
act, and the difference between the various acts 
and their objects, is something which does not 
fall within the scope of the proper object of sen- 
sation, e. g., color, sound, etc., nor of the coirimon 
object of sensation, such as extension, shape, etc., 
nor is it the object of the memory, the imagina- 
tion or instinct. 

On the other hand, sensation is not the object 
of a spiritual faculty, since sensations and their 
differences, both in themselves and in their ob- 
jects, are sensible things, which cannot be directly 
attained by a spiritual faculty. 

2. Nature and Object of the Common Sense. 

The object of the common sense is 

(a) to perceive the external and internal sen- 
sations and their objects, the former directly, the 
latter as already perceived by the senses; 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 45 

(b) to perceive the difference between the 
various sensations and their objects, not of course 
by real reflection or judgment, but in a concrete, 
material manner ; 

(c) to perceive the sensitive organs, the body, 
its single parts, not directly but indirectly, yet in 
and with the sensations. The reason of this is 
because sensations are immanent actions of the 
animated composite ; hence the common sense can- 
not perceive the acts of sensation without at the 
same time perceiving their organic principle. 

From what has been said it is evident that the 
common sense is an organic faculty. For, 

(a) its formal object is something sensible; 

(b) it is also found in brutes; 

(c) its organ is material — ^the brain. 

3. The Organ of the Common Sense. 

Though the common sense, or sensitive con- 
sciousness has been demonstrated as a distinct 
function it would be false to argue that thie, sense 
is a single separate faculty apart from others, 
having a special organ. 

Accordingly, some (Mercier) regard the com- 
mon sense not as a distinct or special faculty, dis- 
connected from the others, but simply as a power 
of associating our sensations. They consider this 
power not to occupy a special cerebral center but 
to depend on the combined action of the cerebral 
centers affected by the exercise of the external 
senses and on the conduction along the nerve- 
fibres that connect these various centers. 

Others (Willems) explain the matter thus: the 
common sense is distinct from the other senses, 



46 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

but not adequately — much as the whole is distinct 
from its parts. 

For, the common sense perceives all the internal 
sensations as also the external ones and their ob- 
jects, in order that they may be distinguished 
among themselves and that there may be sensitive 
consciousness of them. 

This, however, would be impossible unless the 
common sense 

(a) would in some way concur as a rem.ote 
elecitive principle; 

(b) would at the same time receive them into 
itself as their remote object. 

For sensations are vital acts and as such inhere 
in the elicitive principle and, because they are ac- 
cidents, they cannot be wrenched from it or pass 
over into some other vital principle. 

Therefore, the common sense is the principle 
and remote subject of all sensations and, hence, 
cannot be distinguished adequately from the 
single senses, but as a common sensitive power 
embraces all of them. 

Hence there is no act of sensation which is not 
at the same time, at least remotely, an act of the 
common sense. 

As a consequence, its organ includes all others 
in itself and is the cerebro-spinal nervous system. 

Similarly, those who postulate an internal sense 
think it to be explained as an association that 
grows up between the qualitatively different sen- 
sations of the various senses and a sensation of a 
uniform character, namely muscular sensation, 
which accompanies them all. This association 
they believe possible because the subject who ex- 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 47 

periences the two sets of sensations is one and 
the same person. This association is only a func- 
tion of the common sense and has been called 
sense-consciousness. 

B. Sense-Memory. 

1. Idea of Memory. It is clear that we not 
only perceive, think, wish, etc., but that we are 
able to retain these acts and their objects in some 
way, so that later we may recall them and recog- 
nize them as past. 

Memory, then, is the faculty by which we re- 
tain, recall and recognize past events as past 
events. 

This distinguishing feature of memory implies 
particularly two elements, (a) the recognition 
of the event, (b) the reference of it to its place 
in the past. 

2. Kinds of Memo7-y. 

(a) By reason of its origin memory is either 
sensitive or intellectual. 

Sense-memory is found in man and brute, and 
its objects are the past acts of sensitive cognition 
and sensitive appetite and their objects. 

Intellectual memory, belonging to man alone, 
has for its direct object the past acts of the in- 
tellect and will. But on account of the identity 
of the rational and sensitive soul in man, it ex- 
tends also to sensitive acts, apprehended, however, 
in an immaterial manner. 

3. The Elements in Memory. 

It seems that we ought to distinguish three ele- 
ments in memory: retention of acts of cognition 
and appetition ; their recall ; their recognition. 



48 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(a) Retention. It is evident that our acts and 
their objects in order to be an object of memory- 
must in some manner abide in us, otherwise we 
would have a new cognition whenever the memory- 
exercises itself. 

The question is: How do acts remain in us, as 
acts or as potencies? 

In answer to this question we may argue that 
acts cannot remain in us 

Numerically as acts of the cognitive or appeti- 
tive faculty; nor do they remain in us as uncon- 
scious acts which are not noticed. 

For the act of memory is not numerically the 
same as the past act, since it has the past act as 
its object of recognition. For instance, the joy 
I now feel is one thing and its recollection, an- 
other. 

If, then, the past acts and events do not remain 
actually, they can remain only potentially, after 
the manner of a disposition or habit. 

The mental likeness of the object expressed by 
the faculty, in some way or other, seems to remain 
after the acts have passed. The acts of cognition 
and appetition impress themselves, as it were, on 
the soul, leaving a sort of vestige of their passing 
by which they may be easily found and recognized, 
just as the acts of a musician effect and leave be- 
hind in the artist a disposition or habit even when 
he is not actually playing an instrument. 

(b) Recall, (aa) Manner of Recall. The 
acts preserved in the memory may be reproduced 
in a twofold way, spontaneously and voluntarily. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 49 

Spontaneous recall occurs when, on account of 
some object or because of some determination of 
nature, the former acts revive in us. 

Voluntary recall consists in this that we pur- 
posely intend to recall former acts. This vol- 
untary recall belongs to man only, and, of itself, 
has its source in the rational nature of man which 
is gifted with the power of freedom and reflec- 
tion. 

Laws of Recall. The laws of recall of spon- 
taneous as well as voluntary memory are based on 
the Laws of Association of Ideas. The laws of 
Association mean that our thoughts do not lie 
isolated in our minds but are connected with each 
other in logical sequence by a vast array of as- 
sociates. The chief of these laws are : 

The law of contiguity in space and time ; 

The law of similarity — identity, unity, affinity ; 

The law of contrast. 

The law of contiguity formulates the truth that 
the mind in the presence of an object or an event, 
whether actual or ideal, tends to recall other ob- 
jects and events formerly closely connected in 
space or time with that now present. The process 
of learning to walk, to speak or write, and the ac- 
quisition of various manual arts, rests on the 
tendency of actions which are repeated in suc- 
cession to become so united that each recalls the 
other. 

The law of similarity expresses the general con- 
dition that mental states recall their like in past 
experience. Associations by similarity are in- 
numerable. A photograph recalls the original; a 
face we see, a story we read, a song we hear, re- 



50 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

mind us of similar experiences of the past. Paint- 
ing, sculpture, the drama and the other fine arts, 
seek to please by idealizing things that are similar 
to those perceived before. The pleasures of wit 
and humor, the charm of happy figurative lan- 
guage, the admiration won by great strokes of 
genius, are in the same way largely based on the 
satisfaction of the tendency by which the mind 
is impelled to pass from one thought to its like. 
The law of contrast announces the fact that 
the mind in the presence of any mental state tends 
to reproduce contrasted states previously ex- 
pierenced. The idea of prodigal wealth recalls 
that of needy poverty; cold suggests heat; white, 
black; virtue, vice. 

In addition to these primary laws there are 
certain other secondary laws which determine the 
efficacy of memory and its power of recall. They 
are 

Vividness ; 

Frequency of repetition; 
Recentness. 

The law of vividness implies that the deeper, 
the more intense, the more vigorous the original 
impression or thought, the more permanently is 
• it retained by the mind and the more readily re- 
called. That is the reason for saying, "First im- 
pressions last longest." The novelty, beauty, or 
overwhelming power of a single experience may 
give a life-long permanence. 

According to the law of frequency the next 
idea to enter the mind, whenever there is recall 
of former experiences, will be the one most fre- 
quently associated with the subject one is think- 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 51 

ing about. The word "cocoa," for instance, may 
bring before the mind not only a steaming cup 
and the flavor of its contents, but also a daintily 
clad figure in cap and apron bearing in her hand 
the brand of some well known cocoa manufac- 
turer. If a typist or pianist has learned one sys- 
tem of fingering it is almost impossible to change, 
because each letter and each note is associated 
with the idea of movement of a particular finger. 

The law of recentness signifies that the shorter 
the interval which has elapsed and the fewer the 
intervening experiences, the more easily a past 
thought or event is recalled. That is the reason 
why the reading or studying of a new subject 
should be repeated at brief intervals in order that 
it may be fixed indelibly on the mind. 

(c) Recognition. 

It is not enough for memory that our acts are in 
some way retained and reproduced, they must 
also be recognized as past. This recognition may 
occur in two ways : 

(aa) Directly, when an act formerly present 
is now represented through the imagination, 
without any reflection about the identity of act 
and object. Thus a wolf, experiencing hunger, 
recalls the hare caught and devoured in such or 
such a place, and repairs to that place. 

This direct recognition is found in sensitive 
memory and seems to consist in the representa- 
tion of the imagination which, unlike external 
sensation, does not present the present object but 
a non-present one. 

(bb) Reflex Recognition consists in a compar- 
ison made between the object of the present act 



52 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

and of the acts of the past, and an affirmation 
of their identity. 

It is evident that reflex recognition can belong 
only to rational beings. The proper object of the 
intellect is, of course, the universal; but, since 
the imagination furnishes the material for the 
action of the intellect, and since sense-memory al- 
ways pre-supposes -a single past act, intellectual 
memory presupposes sense-memory and has re- 
course to it even in the understanding of im- 
material things. 

4. The Organ of Sense-Memory. 

Some (Willems) hold that the sense-memory is 
part of the common sense and that it is inade- 
quately distinguished from the external and other 
internal senses. These claim that certain parts 
of the anterior brain are the organ of memory. 

For the qualities of memory, cf. Dubray, In- 
troductory Philosophy, pp. 85 ff . 

C. The Imagination. 
1. Idea and Object of the Imagination. 

We know that we not only perceive objects but 
that we can, even in the absence of any actual 
sensation of a physical object, re-present to our- 
selves objects perceived at some former time and 
that we may form images of objects never per- 
ceived before; e. g., the image of a golden moun- 
tain, a house of crystal, etc. 

The power to do this is the imagination, which 
may be defined as the faculty of forming re- 
presentations either of qualities or of whole ma- 
terial objects that have been previously presented 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 53 

in perception but which are now no longer actual- 
ly present. 

2. It seems that the organ of the imagination 
is the whole brain since it can image all the objects 
of the other senses. This seems to be confirmed 
also by experience. For certain activities of the 
imagination are hindered when certain parts of 
the brain are injured. 

3. Nature of the Imagination. 

The imagination is not merely a material or 
physical faculty in the sense of the Materialists, 
nor is it a spiritual faculty as the associationists 
Hume, Bain, Spencer, etc., would have it. The 
latter confound the intellect and the association 
of ideas with the phantasms of the imagination. 
It is an organic faculty, because its object is ma- 
terial, because it re-presents its objects in a ma- 
terial way, and because its organ is material. 

However, the imagination is a powerful instru- 
ment of the intellect. For, 

(a) Since its activity precedes that of the in- 
tellect and since it prescinds from the elements of 
time and space, it prepares the object of the 
senses for intellectual abstraction. 

(b) Inasmuch as the activity of the imagin- 
ation follows the act of the intellect it, in a man- 
ner, clothes spiritual objects in sensible forms, so 
that the cognition of them may be more complete 
and in harmony with our intellectual and sensitive 
nature. 

We must not conceive the images of the Imag- 
ination after the manner of physical images 
painted on canvas. The images of the imagina- 



54 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tion are vital images, which render the cognitive 
subject analagously similar to the object cognized. 
4. Division of the Imagination: Reproductive 
and Creative Imagination. 

(a) Reproductive Imagination. The repro- 
ductive imagination represents objects as per- 
ceived by the senses without making any change 
in them. This reproduction may be 

(aa) Spontaneous, in as far as it is effected 
either by certain organic distrubances of the brain 
(as occurs in sleep and hallucination), or by the 
actual presence of sensations, such as sight, touch, 
hearing, memory, etc. 

(bb) Voluntary, if it is brought about by the 
will. The latter can be effected only by man, 
whilst the former is found also in brutes. 

The reproduction is brought about by the laws 
of association mentioned above in the considera- 
tion of the memory, 

(b) Creative Imagination. The creative im- 
agination forms images of objects not actually 
perceived or, in a subjective way, modifies them, 
fills them out and completes them. This remod- 
eling of its own contents it may accomplish by 
itself, as in dreams and reveries, which are usual- 
ly wanting in coherence. The fruitful use of the 
creative imagination, however, is generally found 
only when the faculty is employed in conjunction 
with reflection and under the direction of the 
higher faculty of reason. Such is the imagination 
of the artist in the production of his work. 

We must not, however, understand the activity 
of the creative imagination in the sense that it 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 55 

produces something entirely new. The imagin- 
ation cannot re-present anything which was not 
at one time or other perceived by the senses; 
e. g., a person born blind has no image of color. 

D. Instinct or the Sense of What Makes 

FOR WELL-BEING. 

Perception and association do not explain the 
whole of sensitive life. There is a sense in an- 
imals which enables them to know what is use- 
ful or harmful to the preservation of the individ- 
ual and the species. We see them pursue what 
is beneficial and flee from danger and pain. The 
Schoolmen called this the "estimative power." We 
might term it the sense of what makes for well- 
being. 

As some of the actions which result from its 
guidance are those promoting the particular 
species of the animal and transcending its individ- 
ual experience — such as the weaving of webs by 
spiders and the building of nests by birds — it is 
also called instinct. 

There are other actions dictated by it which 
show an individual initiative and an adaptability 
that can be trained and perfected by practice. 

Instinct does not seem to be the exclusive pos- 
session of brutes. There are reasons which show 
that we find it also in man. 

(a) From Parity. Instinct is found in brutes 
and is not only necessary for sensitive life but 
even pre-eminent in it. 

Now it might be said that man is not inferior 
to the brute in the more perfect senses. 



56 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Should some one say that this sense is useless 
to man, because he possesses the higher faculty 
of reason and because it is contrary to the dignity 
of man to be guided by blind instinct, we might 
reply: it is true that man should be led by rea- 
son; yet reason, which is only imperfectly de- 
veloped in early life, presupposes the activity of 
the vegetative and sensitive life. Before a human 
being can provide for his needs by reason, a sense 
is required for the preservation and well-being 
of the vegetative and sensitive life. This sense 
must recognize what is good or harmful for the 
body. 

(b) From Necessity. It is not enough that 
we recognize objects which are proper or common 
to the external senses, and that we become aware 
of and recall our acts and their objects by the 
internal senses, but we must also perceive the 
suitableness or unsuitableness of material objects 
in order to pursue or avoid them. 

Now, the external and the other internal senses 
do not formally cover this ground. Neither does 
the intellect do it directly, since it does not di- 
rectly perceive the material suitableness or un- 
suitableness of material objects. 

(c) From Experience. It seems clear from 
experience that man sometimes performs actions 
very useful to him by mere impulse of nature, 
without previous intellectual cognition or experi- 
ence. Thus, every one is led by nature to put 
forth his hands, head, or feet, in a manner suit- 
able to avoid some threatening danger to the body, 
or hold fast to objects which are slipping from 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 57 

his grasp, or reach out tov>7ards objects lying at 
a distance. 

Infants, who surely do not reason, extend their 
limbs in a way suitable to reach objects, accept 
suitable food or reject that which is unsuitable, 
without knowing the reason for doing so. 

Now, this concrete judgment regarding the suit- 
ableness or unsuitableness of material objects is 
not the formal and proper object of the other 
senses. Therefore. 

Still, we do admit that instinct is a power more 
evident in brutes than in man. This is explained 
by the fact that they have not reason to guide 
them in their actions. 

Hence, too, the more reason is perfected in us. 
the more does instinct retire into the background 
and become subordinate to the intellect. Under 
the influence of reason it becomes highly per- 
fected, as may be judged from the skill manifested 
in works of art in the execution of which bodily 
organs, such as touch, sight, hearing, etc., are 
required. 



58 ESSENTIALS OP PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER II 
SENSITIVE APPETENCY. 

1. Division of Appetency. 

Appetency in general means a natural tendency 
or inclination towards a good. By a good we 
here understand every object which is suitable 
to the nature of the being attracted by it. 

Every being has by its nature certain inclin- 
ations or tendencies ; in fact the nature of a being 
is the being itself regarded under the particular 
aspect of possessing a fundamental inherent ten- 
dency towards a definite end which is its good. 
Hence the good may also be defined as the object 
towards which every being by its nature tends. 

In sensitive and rational beings the tendency 
follows upon cognition. 

Even plants and all inanimate nature have this 
tendency which impels them blindly towards that 
which is good and perfective of their natures. 

Hence there are two classes of tendencies or 
appetitions : 

(a) Natural tendencies which are those found 
in non-sentient beings, in virtue of which they are 
drawn towards their particular good. They are 
called natural because they are wrapped up with 
the very nature of the being. 

(b) Elicited appetitions which are roused to 
activity by cognition. They comprise the feelings 
of conscious attraction towards their particular 
good in sentient beings. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 59 

Elicited appetition again is twofold : 
Sensitive or spontaneous appetition, which de- 
pends on sensitive cognition; and rational or 
volitional appetition which depends on intellectual 
cognition. 

2. Definition of sensitive or spontaneous ap- 
petition. Sensitive or spontaneous appetition is 
an inclination or tendency in a sentient being in 
virtue of which it is drawn towards some object 
apprehended by it as a good. 

Hence the object of sensitive appetition is the 
sensible good. 

3. Difference between sensitive appetition and 
sensitive cognition, and between sensitive and 
rational appetition. 

(a) Sensitive cognition of itself and always 
tends towards the mental representation of the 
object, whereas sensitive appetition, presupposing 
this mental representation, strives after the pos- 
session of the object. 

Sensitive cognition of itself and always per- 
fects the cognitive agent; whilst sensitive appeti- 
tion may often inflict injury, whenever, namely, 
the good towards which it inclines is only ap- 
parently good. 

(b) The objects of sensitive appetition are 
exclusively material objects ; whilst the objects of 
rational appetition are also spiritual things. 

Of itself sensitive appetition is not free, but is 
borne with necessity towards its object, provided 
the latter has been sufficiently presented to it. 

Rational appetition is free regarding each par- 
ticular object and also exercises dominion over 
sensitive appetition. 



60 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

4. Feeling, Passion, Emotion. 

From the variety of terminology it is clear that 
the subject of feeling, passion, emotion or senti- 
ment, is rather vague in psychology. To simplify 
the matter we may consider the subject under 
three heads : feelings, in the restricted sense, 
passion, emotion. 

1. Feelings. According to the above division 
we restrict the term "feeling" to pleasure and 
pain, which are elementary processes in affective 
life. The term "pleasure" and the term "pain" 
are difficult to define. Their meaning, however, 
can be easily experienced. Pain applies chiefly 
to feelings resulting from organic conditions, for 
instance, a wound, a soreness, an ache. Yet some 
mental states due to other causes are also called 
painful. "Unpleasantness" jils a more general 
term and applies to all phases of mental life. It 
indicates less than pain, and many states of con- 
sciousness to which we €ould hardly apply the 
term "painful" may be called unpleasant. The 
same distinction is also applied, though less gen- 
erally, to the terms "pleasure" and "pleasant- 
ness." 

Pleasure results from the healthy, vigorous, 
normal exercise of the various powers. Inactiv- 
ity and rest, as such, are not pleasant. The most 
agreeable rest is a change in the nature and in- 
tensity of activity. 

Pain and unpleasantness result from excessive 
exercise or excessive restraint. The complete in- 
abtivity of a faculty, such as the ear, eye, imag- 
ination, intellect, especially if prolonged, becomes 
very painful. Think of always being in complete 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 61 

darkness or remaining with eyes closed, of mak- 
ing no motion whatever, of not thinking at all; 
it would be unbearable. On the other hand, ex- 
cessive exercise is also painful. Too bright a 
light, too loud a sound, too great a muscular ef- 
fort, are sources of pain. 

2. Passion. Passion is essentially a thing of 
the body. It is a kind of suffering, as the word 
indicates — suffering in the broad sense of having 
something done to oneself. 

The attraction of the object works on the nerv- 
ous system so as to produce a kind of agitation, 
tension or vibration. This tension, while wear- 
ing out the tissue and exhausting strength, stirs 
up and lets loose a stream of energy leading to 
impetuous action. When the movement has ex- 
pended itself, the amount of strain undergone is 
manifested by the relapse and physical exhaustion 
which follows. 

Passion, then, is a distinct dominating force 
by itself. It arises from the particular way of 
viewing the object as beautiful or pleasurable, or 
the opposite, and a desire for beauty or pleasure, 
or an aversion for the contrary. It is a strong 
force, spontaneous and automatic, and resenting 
the control of reason and will. It tends towards 
its object by a vehement impetuosity, regardless 
of moral and prudential reasons. In short, pas- 
sion, taken alone, is the vital function proper to 
the animal and represents the purely animal in 
human nature. 

The passions in man are not of themselves evil. 
Each passion has its proper place and purpose. 
The evil comes in only when they rise to such 



62 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

violence as to upset the mental balance and inter- 
fere with reason and control; or, when they are 
deliberately indulged in under circumstances 
where indulgence is out of place and morally 
wrong. 

Emotion. Emotion is not the same as passion. 
We perceive this in the tender spiritual affections 
which one person may entertain towards another, 
for instance, on the ground of friendship or re- 
lationship. Here we find the passionless, calm 
purity of man's rational nature combined with 
the vibratory disturbance of sense-feeling, not 
however amounting to passion. 

Emotion may be described as "the sympathetic 
vibration of the sense-faculties in response to the 
activities of the spiritual faculties — intellect and 
will — but without awakening the full power of 
sense." Let us use an illustration. If you strike 
a tuning fork it will at once give out its full sound. 
Bring it closer to another tuning-fork of the same 
pitch and the second, without being struck, will 
begin to vibrate slightly and thus give out the 
same note, though not by any means as fully as 
if it had been struck. 

Similarly in man the sense-faculties are not 
only capable of working strongly when struck by 
their objects, but they are also capable of answer- 
ing sympathetically to the strong workings of 
the rational faculties when these are impressed 
by their objects. 

We may make what has been said clearer by 
an example, say the love of a brother for his sister. 
The brother will be fully conscious of the woman- 
ly beauty of his sister, but he will never dream of 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 63 

contemplating her in this light. For this would 
naturally rouse a passionate love, out of place be- 
tween members of the same family. He considers 
her only under the idea of a family relation or 
else according to the excellence of her character. 
The outcome is a purely spiritual love. Yet, be- 
cause man is a being composed of body and soul, 
of spirit and sense, this spiritual love will be 
tinged with emotion; that is, the sense-nature 
will respond sympathetically to the activity of 
the rational faculties, thus producing the tender- 
ness of emotional feeling. This emotional feeling 
will not, however, develop into passion or display 
that uncontrollable vehemence which is char- 
acteristic of passion. It will serve rather as an 
accompaniment to the rational faculties, giving 
a glow of warmth to what would otherwise be cold 
and hardly human. It relieves our purely spiritual 
perceptions of their inhuman coldness and thin- 
ness, makes us feel that we are body and soul to- 
gether, and thus gives a sense of concrete reality 
to our activities. In this way emotion encourages 
us to proceed by assuring us of the value and 
efficacy of what we do. 

What is true about the value of the emotions 
for ourselves, is likewise true of the value of the 
emotions in our influence over others. I am not 
referring to an excessive or morbid emotionalism. 
This, besides making other people uncomfortable, 
breeds disgust and deprives us of all influence. 
What I mean is a measure and degree of emotion 
which manifests strength and not weakness, which 
is an embelhshment and not a defect. I mean 
that extremely dehcate thing which does not seem 



64 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

to carry us away but is always under full control ; 
something which lends warmth and color to our 
words and actions and makes us thoroughly hu- 
man. 

To illustrate: Let a speaker who lacks this qual- 
ity ascend the platform. No matter how fluent 
his speech, how perfect his delivery, the audience 
will feel that they are listening to an academic 
exercise and will remain unresponsive to what 
they hear. Let the same speaker try to put force 
into his speech by raising his voice and by more 
vivacious action, and his academic exercise will 
degenerate into a piece of rant. 

But let another speaker, posessed of this qual- 
ity, come before the same audience. His manner 
may be tame and undramatic, without much grace 
of gesture and delivery, yet everybody will be 
deeply impressed. There is a sympathetic some- 
thing in his voice, something earnest in his man- 
ner, which seems to account for it all. It is some- 
thing subtle which makes all feel that here is a 
man speaking to man, mind to mind, and heart 
to heart. We sometimes call it the power of or- 
atory, sometimes the magnetism of personality. 
But, let the ultimate explanation be what it may, 
it seems to lie in the fact that the rational powers 
arouse in a special way that sympathetic accom- 
paniment of sense which we call emotion and that 
emotion, although scarcely perceived in itself, is 
the medium by which the communication of per- 
sonality is conveyed. 

Emotions, therefore, depend on the operations 
of the mind, on the character of the thoughts we 
entertain. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 65 

Division of Emotions. No psychologist has 
ever attempted a complete classification of the 
emotions. For practical purposes we may adopt 
the traditional division. Emotions may be divided 
into — 

(a) Self-Regarding Emotions. These emo- 
tions refer to the personal good of the individual. 
They are based on the innate tendency to self- 
preservation, self-assertion and development. 
Some of them refer to things that are conducive 
to the fundamental ends of man and are therefore 
objects of love; others refer to things that are 
antagonistic to them and are therefore objects 
of aversion. Some of these emotions are, self- 
importance (self-esteem, self-complacency, self- 
respect, self-reliance, pride, self-pity) , love of ap- 
probation, love of activity (ambition, rivalry, em- 
ulation), fear, anger, remorse, shame, self-con- 
demnation. 

(b) Altruistic Emotions. Man is made to live 
in society. Therefore he must also have certain 
emotions which refer to others. Some of these 
emotions are sympathy, love of friendship, family 
affections, local, business, neighborhood interests, 
etc., and the opposite emotions — hard-heartedness, 
hatred, cruelty, scorn, etc. 

(c) Intellectual Emotions. The basis of in- 
tellectual emotions is love of truth, knowledge. 
Man wants to know. Associated with this love 
of truth is ignorance, novelty, surprise, wonder, 
curiosity, investigation, pursuit, discovery, con- 
sistency, etc. 

(d) Esthetic Emotions. These emotions are 
based on the fact that certain persons, things and 



66 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

actions are called beautiful, pretty, graceful, sub- 
lime, melodious, witty, etc., while others are ugly, 
inharmonious, etc. 

5. Sensitive Appetite An Organic Faculty. 

There is no more reason for asserting that the 
sensitive appetite is a spiritual faculty than for 
saying that the cognitive faculty of sensation on 
which it depends is spiritual. Its seat is not in 
the soul by itself but in the compound of soul and 
body, in the animated organism. 

This is clear from the close relationship which 
is seen to exist between the sensitive appetite 
and the organism. That some intimate relation- 
ship does exist between the two is evident from 
the physical manifestations which accompany the 
emotion of delight: the supply of blood becomes 
more copious in the brain, as a peculiar bright- 
ness of the eye indicates, respiration becomes 
more active, with the general result that the tem- 
perature of the body rises and the nutritive proc- 
esses are quickened and furthered. Grief and 
sadness have effects that are almost opposite : 
the circulation appears impeded, respiration 
slackens and is fitful, nutrition in general is re- 
tarded, a lack of appetite, indigestion, etc., super- 
vene. 

These are only two examples, but they are suf- 
ficient to indicate that the sensitive emotions are 
indeed modifications of the organism. 

Organ of Sensitive Appetency — Not the Heart. 

It is a well attested fact that there is a close 

connection between the heart and the emotions. 

The effect of sorrowful emotions is a slackening 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 67 

of the beatings of the heart, which is betrayed by 
a blanching of the cheeks and a general depression 
of the whole organism. Joy and hope have just 
the opposite effects: the pulsations are quickened, 
the blood flows more abundantly to all the organs 
and gives the feeling of contentment and vitality. 
These common experiences are recorded in all the 
languages by the use of such stock expression as 
"to have a heavy heart," "to have a broken heart," 
"to be light-hearted." 

The question, is whether we are right in con- 
cluding that the heart is the seat, or organ, of 
the emotions 'and affective sensibility. The philos- 
ophers of old considered that it was, as indeed 
the uneducated today still consider it to be. But 
scientifically speaking, it is not so. The heart is 
nothing more than a muscle and has nothing in 
common with either sensation or the affective 
states dependent upon it. The real organ of the 
sensitive appetite is the nerve-centers, which are 
the physiological basis of all psychical life in man. 

The popular error which refers the emotions 
to the heart, is easily explained by the correspond- 
ing changes in the heart's action which accompany 
these states of feeling. Roughly, the physiological 
explanation is that the heart comes under the con- 
trol of the nerve-centers through two groups of 
nerve-fibres that belong respectively to the pneu- 
mogastric nerve and the sympathetic nerve. Any 
excitation of the former slackens the movement of 
the heart, whilst any excitation of the latter ac- 
celerates it. 

Hence it is clear why the emotions, which act 
directly upon the nerve-centers, come to have a 



68 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

reacting influence upon the motions of the heart, 
and why, conversely, modifications in the con- 
traction of the heart, by varying the supply of 
blood to the brain, have an effect upon the psychic 
activity of the person. 

6. Spontaneous Movement. Spontaneous 
movement results from an act of sensitive ap- 
petite, and is therefore dependent upon previous 
perception. That spontaneous movements take 
place in both man and animals is clear from ex- 
perience. 

In his analysis of spontaneous movement St. 
Thomas assigns three kinds of causes. The 
muscles put into action by the nerves are the 
immediate efficient cause exciting the movement. 
The determining cause consists in the desires 
urging the sentient being, sensuous appetitions 
that determine the act and regulate the loco- 
motive power appropriate to it. And the third 
is the directing cause, which is some act of sen- 
uous cognition — more often than not of the in- 
stinctive faculty that estimates the worth of an 
object; this cognition awakens and directs cona- 
tion, which immediately provokes the movement. 

Although the external or internal stimulus is 
not the sole or adequate cause of spontaneous 
movement, its influence is nevertheless a real one 
in so far as it is necessary to bring the cognitive 
powers into operation. What is not infrequently 
spoken of as the environment of the animal is, 
then, a remote cause, a stimulus, of the spontan- 
eous movement. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 69 

Article 5. Comparative or Animal 
Psychology. 

The Difficulty Involved in This Matter. Com- 
parative or- animal psychology investigates the 
nature of the mind by comparing its manifesta- 
tions in man and the various species of animals. 
There is a difficulty in this which can hardly be 
bridged over. "Careful reflection must convince 
us," writes Father Maher, "that no matter what 
pains and industry be devoted to the observation 
of the lower animals, our assurance regarding the 
genuine character of their subjective states can 
never be more than a remote conjectural opinion." 
(Psychology, ed. 6, p. 580.) 

Our arguments, then, are arguments from an- 
alogy. And when we consider the strictly scien- 
tific evidence, we must admit "that the grounds 
for the analogical inference to the character of 
the intellectual and emotional states of the mon- 
key, the dog, or the elephant, are very slender 
indeed, whilst our conjectures as to the quality 
of the mental activity of the insects are utterly 
worthless." (Maher.) 

Father Wasmann, S. J., writes regarding the 
same subject: "The key to a scientific enquiry 
into the nature of the animal soul is evidently the 
soul of man. For we have no immediate insight 
into the psychic acts of the animal ; we can only 
infer their existence and nature from the exterior 
actions which jour senses perceive. We must 
compare the manifestations of our own psychic 
life, the interior causes of which are known to 
us from our inner consciousness. Consequently, 
scientific phylosophy applies the same key as 



70 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

pseudo-psychology, but it follows critical methods. 
It does not forget, as the other does, the funda- 
mental law of a rational explanation of nature 
which runs thus: we must explain phenomena in 
the simplest way possible, and we are not allowed 
to attribute to animals higher psychic faculties 
than are requisite for the explanation of definite 
and well-observed facts." (Instinct and Intel- 
ligence, ed. 2, p. 6.) 

Thesis 10 — All Animals Possess Some Power of 
External Sensation. Those of the Higher Type 
Seem to Manifest bij Their Actions That They 
Also Possess Internal Senses. 

Statement of the Question. 1. Sensation is 
the power of perceiving concrete, material objects 
and of striving after them when perceived. The 
sensitive faculties, as we have stated, are two- 
fold : cognitive and appetitive. 

(a) Sensitive cognition is a vital reaction by 
which the sentient faculty in response to an im- 
pression from a particular material object pro- 
duces within itself a mental likeness of that 
object. 

(b) Sensitive appetition is the faculty by which 
the sentient being prosecutes the good or avoids 
the evil as apprehended by the senses. 

2. Animals may here be described as those 
beings which possess organs similar to those of 
man, by which they exercise sensitive life. 

Animals of the lower type are those whose 
organism, on account of its microscopic character, 
and whose mode of operation on account of its 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 71 

simplicity, does not manifest either a central 
organ or operations which can be performed only 
by the internal senses. 

When, therefore, we claim external sensation 
for all animals, we do not claim it for all to the 
same extent. It is only of the higher animals 
that we maintain that by their actions they man- 
ifest external as well as internal senses. Some 
lower types have only the sense of touch and 
probably that of taste. Yet, it seems, that even 
some of the lower types reveal certain sensibility 
to light and sound, which is sometimes called 
dermatoptic sensibility. 

3. The internal senses are those mentioned 
and explained before, namely, the common sense, 
the imagination, the sense-memory, and instinct. 

4. Descartes maintained, and some maintain 
today, that animals are mere automata or mar- 
velously constructed machines, whose activities 
are controlled by mechanical laws. 

Part I — All Animals Possess Some Power or 
External Sensation. 

Proof — From Analogy. Animals possess or- 
gans similar in structure to those of man and 
naturally adapted for sensation. 

But beings which possess such organs also 
possess the power of using them. Therefore. 

The Major is evident from common and scien- 
tific experience. 

Proof of the Minor — Nothing occurs in nature 
without a cause or purpose. 

Now, these organs would be for no purpose, if 
animals had not the power to use them. 



72 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Part II — Animals of the Higher Type Possess 
Internal Senses. 

Proof — 1. The Common Sense. The common 
sense is an internal organic faculty which makes 
us aware of the acts of the internal and external 
senses and of the difference between them, al- 
though it does not formally recognize them as 
different. 

But animals of the higher type seem to possess 
this faculty. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) We see higher animals 
prick their ears, in order to hear better, move 
their noses closer to an object, the more readily 
to perceive their odor, extend their tongues to 
taste the object. 

Therefore, they are aware that they perceive 
these objects by their sense-organs. 

But they cannot be aware of this by any ex- 
ternal sense. 

For external senses cannot perceive their own 
particular acts. The eye does not perceive the 
act of vision, nor the ear the act of hearing, etc. 
That would imply real reflection, which is im- 
possible for a material faculty. 

(b) Animals reach out for food which they 
see and smell, not because it is agreeable to sight 
or smell, but because it is good for the taste. 
Others flee from the stick, not because it is re- 
pulsive, but because it inflicts pain. 

Therefore, animals can collect the various qual- 
ities of objects they perceive by the several senses 
into one and can refer these qualities to one and 
the same object. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 73 

But this they cannot, evidently, do by any or 
all of the external senses. 

2. Sense-Memory. Sense-memory is an inter- 
nal organic faculty by which we retain, recall and 
recognize as past the various past events. 

But the animals of the higher type manifest by 
their actions that they have this faculty. There- 
fore. 

Proof of the Minor — Swallows and other birds 
will return after a year's absence to the nest of 
the previous year. Dogs after long absence will 
remember their masters. Animals will avoid what 
caused them pain on some former occasion or 
seek again what caused them pleasure. 

Now, these impressions did not remain in the 
external senses. 

3. Sensitive Imagination. Sensitive imagina- 
tion is an internal organic faculty which forms 
re-presentations or images either of qualities or 
of whole material things that have been previous- 
ly presented in perception but which are now no 
longer actually present. 

But animals of the higher type manifest by 
their actions that they have such a faculty. There- 
fore. 

Proof of the Minor — Animals, such as dogs, 
bark in their sleep. But this is a sign of dream- 
ing. 

Now, dreaming cannot take place without sen- 
sitive imagination. 

Beasts of prey hunt animals which they never 
saw before or in places entirely unknown to them. 

Therefore, they have cognition of objects which 
is neither the result of any external sense nor can 



74 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

be attributed to the memory, properly so-called. 
Therefore. 

4. Instinct. Instinct is an internal organic 
faculty which enables the animal to know what 
is useful or harmful to the preservation of the in- 
dividual and the species. 

Now, animals of the higher type manifest by 
their actions that they have this faculty. There- 
fore. 

Proof of the Minor — The lamb flees from the 
wolf, not because its shape or color is disagree- 
able to the external senses, but because it knows 
the wolf to be its natural foe. 

Birds collect twigs not because they are attrac- 
tive to see, but because they are useful for the 
building of nests. 

Animals when sick avoid food they relished be- 
fore and seek medicinal nourishment. 

But animals cannot obtain knowledge of what 
is useful or harmful to them through the external 
senses. Therefore. 

Note — Sensuous Pleasure. Sensuous pleasure 
is the satisfaction or repose which the faculty of 
the sentient being experiences in the enjoyment 
of the proper objects of the sensitive faculties. 

In proportion as the energy of the faculty is 
greater and the object more suited to call forth 
and satisfy the energy, so much the more intense 
is the pleasure, (cf. Maher, c. XI; pp. 139 ff.) 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 75 

Thesis 11 — Although Animals of the Higher Type 
Possess Instinct, They do not Possess Intel- 
ligence. 

Statement of the Quetion — 1. Opinions, (a) 
Everyone knows that there are many people of all 
classes who attribute intelligence to the animal. 
In many cases, this is the result of a sentimental 
feeling which is apt to recognize in the actions of 
a pet cat or dog activities which are performed 
only by a being endowed with intellect. The mis- 
take which is commonly made is this, that man 
transfers his thoughts to the brain of the animal 
and then innocently draws out from it his own 
ideas and believes them to be the natural activity 
of the brute. 

This popular error is frequently abetted by the 
publications of pseudo-psychologists who, like 
Buechner, Brehm, and others, explain the adap- 
tive activity which proceeds from sensitive knowl- 
edge of the animal by the latter's "own under- 
standing." 

(b) There is a second class of men who laj'' 
claim to scientific scholarship and exactness, and 
yet err in the same matter. These men put the 
double question: 

(aa) is human intelligence essentially differ- 
ent from that of the animal, or different only in 
degree ? 

(bb) is it possible or not that the human mind 
can have developed from the animal faculty of 
sensations? 

Consequently, they admit that some kind of 
intelligence exists in the brute. We are not sur- 



76 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

prised, then, to read in Darwin's Descent of Man 
(ed. 1871, p. 46) that he attributed to the brute 
"some power of intelhgence." 

These modern psychologists take intelligence 
to mean an association of sensuous representa- 
tions, which is brought about by individual ex- 
perience, whilst they call those actions instinctive 
which do not depened on experience. 

(c) The third class of opponents to our theory 
are the associationists. They reduce all man's 
intellectual operations to associations of phan- 
tasms, or, to be more exact, to association of ele- 
mentary sensations which we acquire by the ex- 
ternal senses. If this doctrine were true, there 
would be no reason to deny intellectual life in the 
animal. For there are clearly manifold processes 
of association of phantasms in the animal. 

This theory of sensism is almost universally 
admitted by modern psychologists. 

(d) There is further the mechanistic hy- 
pothesis, according to which instincts are derived 
from acts that in the first instance, as performed 
by the first individuals, were inteligent; by fre- 
quent repetition they became automatic, were 
transmitted by heredity and thus in the course 
of time became mechanical; at bottom they are 
matterialized intelligence. 

2. The Terms. (a) Instinct. Instinctive 
actions are those which spring from impulses of 
the sensitive appetite and sensitive feelings. 
These actions are in themselves unconsciously 
adaptive. Hence, they are neither mere automatic 
actions nor intellectual functions. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 77 

Automatic actions are those which have their 
origin in some internal stimulation of the organ, 
such as the beating of the heart. 

Reflex movement is one that is made in re- 
sponse to peripheral stimulation, v^ithout the in- 
tervention of any conscious effort. 

In instinctive actions sensation participates as 
a cause in producing the corresponding activity. 
Hence, a psychic element must form part of the 
definition of instinct. 

This psychic element is the one which forms 
the distinction between instinctive actions and 
intellectual ones, and consists in the unconscious 
adaptive connection of certain sensitive affections 
with their corresponding activities; e. g., the 
weaving of webs by spiders. 

We may, therefore, define instinct as a sensitive 
impulse of the sensitive appetite which induces 
the being to perform certain actions, the suitable- 
ness of which transcends the knowledge of the 
agent which performs them. 

Accordingly instinct presupposes two things : 

(a) sensitive appetite; 

(b) sensitive cognition. 

Criteria of instinctive actions : 

(a) The essential criterion is the circum- 
stance that the suitableness of the action is be- 
yond the perception of the agent. 

(b) Non-essential criteria are the following: 
(aa) the complete perfection with which 

many instinctive actions are performed without 
any previous experience ; 



78 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(bb) the constant uniformity with which they 
are performed by almost every individual of the 
same species. 

There are, however, a few hereditary instincts 
which require previous practice and individual 
experience for their complete development; e. g., 
the play habit of kittens seems to lead to the 
catching of mice. 

Again, instinctive actions may be divided into 

(a) those which immediately spring from in- 
herited dispositions of the sensitive powers of 
cognition and appetition; 

(b) those which proceed from the same 
powers through the medium of sense-experience. 

From what has been said we may also define 
instinct as the suitable hereditary disposition of 
the potvers of sensitive cognition and appetition 
in the animal. (Wasmann.) 

Note — Cardinal Mercier defines instinct thus: 
Instinct is an impulse in an animal, prior to its 
individual experience, determining it to perform 
certain uniform external actions that are so co- 
ordinated as to further its own welfare and that 
of the species. (A Manual of Modern Scholastic 
Philosophy, v. 1, p. 215.) 

(b) Intelligence. Intelligence means essen- 
tially the power of abstraction and of forming 
universal concepts. It includes, moreover, a de- 
liberative power which recognizes the relations be- 
tween means and end, between an agent and its 
actions. It implies as a consequence the power 
of self-consciousness. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 79 

Proof — 1. Animals do not possess higher fac- 
ulties than their actions warrant. 

But the actions of animals do not warrant the 
assumption of intelligence. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — Beings that have intel- 
ligence (a) make real progress in their thoughts 
by arbitrary signs of language, (b) make prog- 
ress in their actions, (c) understand the rela- 
tion of cause and effect, means and end. 

But animals do not perform any of these ac- 
tions. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) Speech may be taken 
broadly and strictly. 

1. In the strict sense, speech is the faculty of 
manifesting ideas and judgments of the mind by 
words or articulated sounds, which are employed 
by the convention of man as signs of judgments 
and ideas. This is called oral speech. We do not 
argue from this idea of speech, since there are 
other ways of externalizing ideas and judgments, 
as is the case with deaf mutes. 

2. In the broader sense, speech is the power of 
manifesting ideas and judgments of the mind by 
sensible and arbitrary signs. To effect this three 
things are required : 

(a) a faculty for making sensible signs; 

(b) the sign must be arbitrary or conven- 
tional ; 

(c) the sign must reveal, not pleasing affec- 
tions and feelings, nor any kind of cognition 
whatever, but intellectual cognitions — ideas, judg- 
ments and their objects. This is called conceptual 
speech. 



80 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Speech in some form is a necessary complement 
of rational nature. 

Therefore, if animals possess intelligence, they 
must either have real speech or the power to ac- 
quire it. 

But they have neither the one nor the other. 
Therefore. 

The Major — 1. It is evident from the most 
universal inference that, wherever we find sensi- 
tive beings which are at the same time rational, 
there too we find real speech. Even the Terra 
del Fuegans, the most uncultured people, have a 
language by which they express the highest mys- 
teries of religion. 

2. Deaf-mutes and other defectives, despite 
the great difficulty experienced, show an in- 
superable desire to reveal their ideas to others by 
arbitrary signs, and they acquire a ready use of 
those signs. 

3. Man is by nature a social being. However, 
a society of rational beings is impossible without 
speech of some sort. 

Proof of the Minor — To constitute speech, ar- 
bitrary signs are necessary, by which are ex- 
pressed ideas and judgments and their objects. 

Animals have no such signs and cannot acquire 
them. 

For, if left to themselves, they have only nat- 
ural signs by which they manifest grateful or 
unpleasant feelings. 

By the aid of man they may, indeed, learn some 
articulated words and other signs, but they prove 
by their actions that they do not understand them. 



ESSENTIALS OP PSYCHOLOGY 81 

They acquire them only by the laws of associa- 
tion. 

Proof of (b) — Real progress implies the power 
of reflecting upon oneself and one's actions, in 
order to recognize their purpose, amend defects, 
and discover new truths by a process of reason- 
ing. It is obvious that animals do not make prog- 
ress in this manner. There is almost complete 
uniformity of action throughout. ' 

Note — The exact nature of instinct will prob- 
ably remain an enigma for ever. Cardinal Mer- 
cier offers this tentative explanation: "We may 
take it as certain, on the one hand, that the work- 
ing of instinct is neither blind nor automatic; 
and, on the other hand, that an animal is in- 
capable either of conceiving or willing the ab- 
stract good. The question to be answered is, 
then; What kind of intention dominates the an- 
imal in these instinctive actions? It seems 
scarcely probable that animals can imagine the 
remote end for which they work — that the young 
squirrel should have a prevision of the coming 
winter with its hardships. What we think hap- 
pens is that the animal has an imagination of the 
acts which have to be performed hie et nunc and 
this imagination directs its work each moment 
during the performance of it. It has been ob- 
served that whilst an animal has not the ability 
to improve something already achieved, it cer- 
tainly may repair an injury that its work may 
suffer during the process of its achievement ; thus 
it would seem that it is conscious of its acts whilst 
it is doing them. If it be asked what produces 
these images that control its present action, we 



82 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

should reply that the cause is partly objective and 
partly subjective; a present external perception 
or a present internal sensation is an exciting 
cause of the imagination, whilst there is also some 
subjective natural disposition, peculiar to the par- 
ticular animal type, co-operating towards the ef- 
fect." (A Manual of Modern Scholastic Phil- 
osophy, V. 1, p. 216.) 

Thesis 12 — There Is in Animals One Vital Prin- 
ciple From Which Proceed Vegetative and Sen- 
sitive Life. This Vital Principle Cannot Exist 
by Itself. 

Statement of the Question — That life necessi- 
tates some substantial principle from which it 
proceeds, has already been shown. 

The question now is: Are there in brutes two 
vital principles, the one vegetative, the other sen- 
sitive, really distinct, or do vegetative and sensi- 
tive operations in animals flow from one and the 
same vital principle? 

To this question we give the answer in the 
first part of the thesis. We grant, of course, that 
the proximate principles and organs of vegeta- 
tive life are distinct from those of the sensitive 
life. 

In the second part of the thesis we claim that 
the vital principle in animals cannot exist by it- 
self, but only as an essential part of the living 
compound. 

Paf't I — There Is Only One Vital Principle in 
Animals. 

Proof — In a being which constitutes one living 
compound there is only one vital principle. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 83 

But the animal is one living- compound, which 
performs both vegetative and sensitive actions. 
Therefore. 

The Major — That makes a being one and iden- 
tical which, in the physical order, puts it into a 
certain distinct class. 

But a being is put into the class of living beings 
by the principle which gives it life. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) Vegetative life al- 
ways ceases in an organism which has become in- 
capable of sensitive life, and conversely. 

This, however, would not be the case if the an- 
imal were not one and identical, but made up of 
two distinct principles. 

(b) This identity of principle with regard to 
the two kinds of life is confirmed by the admirable 
harmony, existing between the vegetative and 
sensitive activities. This harmony makes of them 
one acting being, one organic whole, though the 
parts are varied, and explains the remarkable 
correspondence between the two kinds of opera- 
tions and the reciprocal influence they exert upon 
one another. 

Part II — The Vital Principle in Animals Can- 
not Exist by Itself. 

Proof — The nature of a being is manifested by 
its actions. 

But the actions of the vital principle in animals 
is intrinsically^ diependient ton ^material (organs. 
Therefore. 



84 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Proof of the Mino7- — All the actions exhibited 
by the animal are of the vegetative and sensitive 
order. Now, these actions are, as we know, in- 
trinsically dependent on a material organ. 

Consequently, the principle from which they 
proceed is also intrinsically dependent on matter, 
and hence cannot exist apart from matter. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 85 

PART III 
RATIONAL LIFE 

Introduction — The subject-matter of rational 
psychology is the human soul, its faculties, its 
nature, its origin, its relation to the body. 

Since we have already investigated into vege- 
tative and sensitive life, we shall here confine our- 
selves to the consideration of those vital acts 
which are peculiar to man. 

In our enquiry we fall back upon the data of 
our consciousness and that of other men, ex- 
pressed in their lives, their customs and language. 
From these data we reason back to the nature of 
the vital acts of thought and volition and to the 
nature of the last principle from which they pro- 
ceed, (cf. Maher, Psychology, chapters 1, 11.) 

THE RATIONAL FACULTIES IN MAN. 

According to the more commonly accepted 
opinion among the Schoolmen the essence of the 
soul does not operate immediately by itself but 
through its faculties. Consequently, the activities 
of rational life have not the essence of the soul 
for their immediate and proximate principle, but 
the faculties which are distinct from the essence. 

The soul, however, is the ultimate and remote 
principle of all vital activity in man. 

Faculty in general signifies a natural ability to 
perform some kind of activity. A rational faculty 
means the mind's ability to undergo a particular 
kind of activity. 



86 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

"A mental faculty or power," writes Father 
Maher, "is not of the nature of a particular part 
of the soul, or of a member different from it as 
a limb is distinct from the rest of the body. It 
is not an independent reality, a separate agent, 
which originates conscious states, out of itself 
and apart from the mind. But neither is it a 
mere group of conscious states of a particular 
kind. It is simply a special 7node through which 
the mind acts." 

"It is admitted by all that a faculty is not a 
force distinct from and independent of the essence 
of the soul, but it is the soul itself, which operates 
in and through the faculty." (Gutberlet, Die Psy- 
chologie, p. 4.) 

Hence, the proposition, "our soul possesses dif- 
ferent faculties," means nothing else than that 
"our soul is a substance which as active principle 
is capable of exerting different species of en- 
ergies." 

"That we are justified in attributing to the soul 
faculties in this sense is abundantly clear. Care- 
ful use of the power of introspection reveals to 
us a number of modes of psychical energy, rad- 
ically distinct from each other and incapable of 
further analysis. To see, to hear, to remember, 
to desire, are essentially different kinds of con- 
sciousness, though all proceed from the same 
source. Sometimes one is in action, sometimes 
another, but no one of them ever exhausts the 
total energy of the mind. They are partial ut- 
terances of the same indivisible subject. But this 
is equivalent to the establishment of certain dis- 
tinct aptitudes of the mind." (Maher.) 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 87 

Distinction of Mental Faculties. The ground 
for the division of mental faculties lies in the 
special nature of the psychical activities and their 
objects. Hence the faculties of the soul, accord- 
ing to the Schoolmen, are distinguished by the 
nature of each faculty and the object towards 
which it is directed. 

As each faculty or power of the soul has been 
given for the accomplishment of a special order 
of actions, it must naturally incline to perforin 
these actions. Hence, the faculties of the soul 
are, by their nature, inclined towards their proper 
actions. This natural inclination of the faculty 
does not refer to this or that individual action, 
but to the entire species of actions which the 
faculty can produce. 

It is, moreover, matter of experience that the 
peculiar intensity in the application of one faculty 
impairs the exercise of the other faculties. For 
instance, a person who exercises the imagination 
to excess will do injury to his keenness and power 
of judgment. 

This is due to the fact that the activity of the 
different faculties is a participation of the activ- 
ity of the soul. But since the soul is one and 
indivisible and of limited power, the concentra- 
tion of its activity with peculiar intensity on one 
faculty must be prejudicial to the other faculties. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The question about consciousness is a very im- 
portant one in rational psychology. It is the chief 
source from which we draw the arguments for 
the character of our internal activity. Moreover, 



88 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

modern psychologists, almost to a man, err on this 
point. Since they are Materialists they must en- 
deavor to explain this mental phenomenon in har- 
mony with their materialistic views. 

Self -consciousness may be defined as the knowl- 
edge the mind has of its acts as its own. 

When roused to action, the intellect not only 
apprehends the thing as it is, but at the same time 
becomes aware of its own act of cognition and of 
itself as the eliciting agent of the act. 

This self -consciousness may be more or less ex- 
plicit. It may be a mere spontaneous concom- 
itant of the act by which the external object is 
apprehended, or it may be a deliberately reflex 
operation in which the cognitive power is directed 
rather upon itself and its own action than upon 
the external object with which it is engaged. In 
the former case it is called direct or concomitant 
consciousness, in the latter, it is called reflex con- 
sciousness. 

That the mind in most of its operations is con- 
comitantly conscious of its actions and of itself, 
is matter of ordinary experience. 

In the normal operations of the intellect — per- 
ceptions, judgments, reasoning, attention, etc. — 
independently of any reflexive effort, the mind 
is usually conscious of itself and its actions. 

But it is in the deliberately reflex act of con- 
sciousness that itself and its operations, and the 
distinction between itself and the operations, are 
most distinctly apprehended by the mind. 

Whilst I am thinking I am spontaneously and 
without effort of deliberate introspection aware 
of the fact that I am thinking about something. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 89 

but I do not attend to the course of my thoughts, 
nor do I explicitly distinguish between my 
thoughts and my thinking self. 

By an effort of attention, however, I can close- 
ly watch the progress of my thinking and notice 
with what clearness I apprehend the question be- 
fore me, what is the relative force of the reasons, 
etc. In this case I clearly distinguish between the 
progress of my thought and the thinking mind. 
The former is seen to be a series of passing acts, 
the latter, an abiding principle of action. 

In this reflex act, therefore, 

(a) the distinction between the permanent 
mind thinking and its transient states is vividly 
brought home to us ; 

(b) we have as full certainty of the existence 
of this permanent mind as of the transient states ; 

(c) we clearly apprehend the identity between 
the mind reflecting and the mind reflected upon. 

From this it follows that a power, which can 
set itself and its own present states before itself 
as an immediate object of cognition, cannot be an 
organic power. For, an organic power is one into 
which matter enters as an essential element, i. e., 
it is a compound of matter and soul that per- 
ceives, feels, hears, etc. But no material faculty 
can double back upon itself, or reflect upon itself 
and its own actions; for instance, the eye cannot 
see its own vision nor itself, the tip of the finger 
cannot touch itself and its own sensation of touch, 
etc. 



90 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Only a simple energy, which exists by itself and 
acts by itself, independently of matter, can thus 
apprehend itself and its action. 

This wonderful power of self-consciousness is, 
as we shall see, an evident proof of the spiritual- 
ity of the human soul. 

OBJECTS DIRECTLY APPREHENDED BY 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

1. The objects of self-consciousness are only 
the acts of the soul, not their inner essence or 
nature. The latter are known to us only through 
a more or less elaborate process of reasoning. 

2. The primary object of self-consciousness is 
the intellectual act and, consequently, the intel- 
lectual agent. But, as this simple rational agent 
is also endowed with other powers, which are 
simultaneously occupied with the same object as 
the intellect, its consciousness of itself makes it 
also aware of the various cognitive and appetitive 
operations, and of the individual notes of the 
object, whose quiddity alone is directly appre- 
hended by the intellect. 

3. Self-consciousness, therefore, apprehends 
the ego, the complete human person, as a com- 
pound of body and soul, with various cognitive 
and appetitive powers, some of which are rational 
and spiritual, whilst others are sensuous and or- 
ganic. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 91 

CHAPTER I 
THE HUMAN INTELLECT 

Article 1. The Object and Nature of the 
Human Intellect. 

Thesis 1 — Experience Testifies That We Have 
Universal Ideas, Which Cannot Be Reduced to 
Sensation As Their Constitutive Elements. 

Statement of the Question — 1. By intellectual 
cognitions we understand the threefold operations 
of the mind which result in ideas, judgments and 
reasoning. 

The present thesis concerns itself with uni- 
versal ideas. 

The question proposed is one of the most funda- 
mental in psychology, especially in our day when, 
in consequence of the rise of experimental psy- 
chology, the cognitive life of man is made the 
object of keen discussion. 

We shall have recourse in our arguments to the 
testimony of consciousness. 

2. We do not consider the intellectual acts here 
discussed from the standpoint of the act itself, 
but only from the standpoint of the object they 
express. 

Besides, we must not confound this question 
with the question about "imageless thoughts" or 
"thinking without words." We readily admit 
that, since man in the present life is dependent in 
his intellectual operations on external and inter- 
nal sensations, he also depends in the use of ideas 



92 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

on the concomitant phantasms or images, at least 
at least the images of words. 

Consequently, our opponents do not make a 
point against us when they appeal to experience 
which tells us that when we think we always ex- 
perience the presence of images, at least the 
images of words. 

3, ■ Concomitant Phantasms or Images. There 
is a great variety of the images that are wont to 
accompany our thoughts. These concomitant 
phantasms differ: (a) according to the diversity 
of the objects of our thoughts, (b) according to 
the difference of condition and disposition of the 
persons, (c) according to the difference in the 
exercise of the faculties. 

(a) When we think of material things which 
are not present to the senses, the images of them, 
or of similar things, revive in the imagination. 
Thus when we think of an animal, even in a gen- 
eral way, we are wont to have a phantasm of 
some animal perceived before. 

If we direct our attention to these images, we 
observe the following characteristics : (a) the 
phantasms are particular, exhibiting a specific 
figure, shape, color, etc.; (b) they are mostly 
fragmentary, as becomes clear when one tries to 
delineate the concomitant images in the proposi- 
tion "the horse is an animal" ; (c) they are so 
volatile that it is difficult to indicate the frag- 
ments of the image which here and now accom- 
panies the concept. 

When we think about immaterial things, for 
instance, about a problem in mathematics, about 
deductive or inductive reasoning, similitudes taken 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 93 

from material objects are usually evoked together 
with the ideas of these immaterial things. 

Such similitudes are not infrequently expressed 
in the words by which we express immaterial 
things. This seems evident when we fix the at- 
tention of the mind directly on the metaphors 
which are used to explain technical terms; e. g., 
"to extract roots," "to grasp things mentally," 
"to measure moral actions by a standard," "to 
indicate the sources of wrong-doing." 

These symbolic images are altogether particu- 
lar, fragmentary and fluctuating. 

In most cases, too, the attention of the mind 
is directed not to these symbolic phantasms pri- 
marily but to the immaterial object. 

(b) The concomitant phantasms also differ 
according to the disposition and condition of the 
person. There are scarcely two persons, who, 
when thinking of the same thing, have exactly 
the same concomitant images. 

There are some persons who hardly ever im- 
agine anything except inasmuch as it is subject 
to the perception of sight (the visual type) ; others 
imagine things as they are subject to hearing 
(the auditory type) ; others, as things are sub- 
ject to the sense of touch (the kinaesthetic type) ; 
whilst others in various ways internally see, hear 
and feel things (the mixed type) . 

Even in one and the same person there may be 
a variety of concomitant phantasms, according 
to the conditions in which he is, the degree of 
fatigue or alertness, and above all according to 
the intensity and attention with which a person 
thinks. 



94 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

When one has acquired the habit of intellectual 
thought, the concomitant phantasms gradually 
disappear and finally the images of words alone 
remain. 

There are, besides, many words which do not 
suggest metaphors, such as conjunctive particles, 
grammatical terminations by which we decline 
nouns and conjugate verbs. 

4. The Opponents of the Thesis. There are 
many modern philosophers and not a few of the 
elaborators of experimental psychology who hold 
views contrary to ours. We merely mention some 
of them : J. Locke, David Hume, David Hartley, 
James Mill, J. Stuart Mill, A. Bain, H. Taine, T. 
Ribot, J. F. Herbart, H. Ebbighaus, G. T. Ziehen, 
W. Wundt, W. James, E. B. Titchener. 

Their General Doctrine. All agree in this that 
they deny an essential distinction between intel- 
lectual and and sense cognition, and that they 
claim sensation to be a constitutive element in all 
human cognition. This main idea is mixed up 
with others and hence the theory goes by differ- 
ent names. 

It is called sensism because its advocates allow 
no other source of human cognition except that 
which is derived from sense-experience. 

It is called associationism, or, the psychology of 
association, because its followers explain the 
origin of intellectual cognition solely by associa- 
tion of elementary sense-perceptions. According 
to these psychologists ideas arise from the simul- 
taneous association or fusion of sensations, whilst 
judgments are derived from successive association 
of sensations. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 95 

It is sometimes called the mind-stuff theoi^y, 
because its adherents combine the teaching of 
atomistic psychology with the doctrine of ideal- 
ism. They contend that the elementary sensations, 
from the union of which our intellectual percep- 
tion arises, constitute that which appears to be 
matter, (cf. James, Principles of Psychology, 
V. I, pp. 145-182.) 

It is called the theory of mental evolution, be- 
cause according to it intellectual cognitions, both 
in the individual as also in successive species, are 
evolved from simple sensations, and then by con- 
stant evolution those things which could hardly 
be understood from internal experience only are 
rendered much clearer, (cf. Titchener, Experi- 
mental Psychology, v. I, pp. 128 ff, James, 1. c.) 

Pa7't I — The Existence of Universal Ideas, In- 
asmuch As They Are Internal Facts. 

Note — A universal idea, in the sense of the 
Schoolmen, is an act of the mind which exhibits 
some note or notes that can be predicated about 
many univocally and separately. We have such 
universal ideas whenever we think of the mean- 
ing of common nouns. 

Proof — According to the testimony of experi- 
ence we use many common nouns and understand 
what is signified by them. 

But this fact proves that we have universal 
ideas. Therefore. 

The Major — There are many common nouns in 
all languages, as we may see by looking into any 
dictionary. We know, moreover, that we experi- 



96 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ence something altogether different when v/e un- 
derstand what the common nouns mean, and some- 
thing different when we do not understand them., 
as happens when we hear words in a foreign lan- 
guage of which we are ignorant. 

Proof of the Minor — A common noun, such as 
"man," does not signify a particular individual, 
nor many individuals taken simultaneously, but 
something which is common to many individuals 
and can be predicated of them univocally and 
separately. 

But this means that we have universal ideas 
in the sense of the Schoolmen. 

Pari // — Universal Ideas Cannot Be Reduced 
to Sensations As to Their Constitutive Elements. 

Proof — A universal idea manifests what is sig- 
nified by the common noun, namely, the note or 
notes common to many individuals. 

But no phantasm, and in particular no phan- 
tasm of words, manifests what is signified by the 
common noun. Therefore. 

Pi'oof of the Minor — 1. Every phantasm rep- 
resents particular sensible qualities of a partic- 
ular individual, so much so that the phantasm of 
"man" might apply to a white man but not to a 
negro, to a small man and not to a tall man. 

Besides, these phantasms, on the part of the 
object, are fragmentary and variable. 

Now, what is signified by a common noun, for 
instance that of "man," is not the particular qual- 
ities of a particular man, nor is it something frag- 
mentary of a man, but it is the note or notes which 
are common to every man. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 97 

2. The phantasm of a word represents partic- 
ular sounds of articulated speech, or particular 
characters in writing, or other particular con- 
ventional signs. 

But the meaning of a common noun is some- 
thing quite distinct from the written word itself, 
or its phantasm ; for it represents a note or notes 
common to all. 

Cor. If Sensism or Associationism were ad- 
mitted, there would be no possibility of science. 
Science treats of the universal. It enquires into 
that which is common to all individuals of the 
same class or species. It reduces carefully ob- 
served facts to universal laws. All this, however, 
cannot be accomplished by the senses. 

Moreover, the basis of all science are necessary 
and immutable truths. The phantasms, however, 
as we know from experience, are variable and 
fluctuating. 

Thesis 2 — We Know From Experience That We 
Have Ideas of Immaterial Things. These Ideas 
Differ Essentially From Images of the Imag- 
ination and Cannot Be Reduced to Them As 
Their Constitutive Elements. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Ideas of im- 
material things are of two kinds : 

(a) the first kind represents things which are 
in their very nature and positively immaterial, 
such as the idea of the human soul ; 

((b) the second class represents some note 
which abstracts from the material, that is, which 
neither includes nor excludes the material, and 



98 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

hence can be applied to material and immaterial 
things, such as the idea of "being." They are 
abstract ideas. 

Since we are to prove the spirituality of the 
human soul later, we may confine our question to 
ideas of the second class. 

2. Symbolic Images. Among the images which 
may accompany our ideas of immaterial things are 
"symbolic" images. Symbolic images are those 
phantasms of material things which have a like- 
ness, though an imperfect one, to immaterial 
things ; for instance, when I think of the courage 
of a soldier I may at the same time have before 
me the image of a lion at bay. 

Part I — We Knoiu From Expedience That We 
Have Ideas of Immaterial Things — Abstract 
Ideas. 

Proof — We know from experience that we have 
knowledge of that which is expressed by abstract 
and technical terms, such as, obligation, possibil- 
ity, necessity, virtue, etc. 

But, if this is the case, we have ideas of im- 
material things, in the sense explained above. 

The Major — We know from experience that in 
our intercourse with men we use abstract and 
technical terms to disclose the ideas of the mind. 
We know, too, that our experience is different 
when we know what these terms mean and when 
we do not understand them. 

Proof of the Minor — What is signified by such 
terms is not something sensible, but something 
far removed from the senses, something which 
abstracts and prescinds from the material. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 99 

Part II — Abstract Ideas, Or, Ideas of Imma- 
terial Things, Essentially Differ From Phantasms 
and Cannot Be Reduced to Them. 

Proof — Ideas of immaterial things express 
something far removed from the senses, as just 
proved. 

But phantasms cannot express or represent such 
things. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — Phantasms, or images 
of the imagination, arise from associations of 
sensations which were had before and cannot ex- 
hibit other than material qualities. 

But the immaterial or abstract ideas we are 
speaking of do not act upon the senses and do not 
contain material qualities. 

Note — That abstract ideas or ideas of imma- 
terial things are not symbolic phantasms is clear 
from the fact that it is something different to 
know what is meant by, say, bravery, and the rep- 
resentation of a lion at bay. 

Cor. The Essential Difference Betiveen Ideas 
and Sense-Perception. 

If we consider ideas and sense-perceptions in 
relation to their object, we find the following dif- 
ferences : 

(a) the objects of sense-perception are ma- 
terial things only; they are individual; they are 
perceived according to their sensible qualities. 

(b) The object of ideas are not only material 
things but immaterial things also; they are not 
only individual things, but also the universal. 
Even in case of material things, ideas grasp their 
essence, a thing the senses cannot do. 



100 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Thesis 3 — The Material Object of the Intellect Is 
Every Being. The Formal Object Is the Es- 
sence Or Inner Reason of Things. In Man's 
Present State, However, It is. Directly, the Es- 
sence of Sensible Things. 

Statement of the Question — 1. The material 
object is the thing as it actually is, anything what- 
soever of which the mind can obtain knowledge. 

The formal object is that by which the material 
object is attained by the faculty. It is that par- 
ticular phase in the object towards which the fac- 
ulty naturally tends. 

Owing to the great diversity of the objects that 
can be thought of by the mind, the formal object 
is of two kinds: 

(a) the proper formal object — the immediate, 
direct, proportionate object — is that which falls 
directly within the range of the faculty and for 
the knowledge of which the faculty is by its nature 
adapted ; 

(b) the improper — the indirect, mediate, sec- 
ondary object — is whatever the cognitive faculty 
cannot know except by the aid of knowledge it 
has of its proper object. The chief indirect ob- 
ject of the intellect is all spiritual beings. 

2. There are three parts in the thesis : 
(a) In the first part we assert that the ma- 
terial object of the intellect is every being, so that 
there is nothing that exists, whether actual or pos- 
sible, necessary or contingent, substantial or ac- 
cidental, material or spiritual, of which the human 
intellect cannot have some knowledge, whether 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 101 

this knowledge is proper or analogous, wholly 
positive or partly negative, provided it is prop- 
erly proposed to the intellect. 

(b) In the second part of the thesis we hold 
that the formal object of the intellect is the es- 
sence or inner reason of things, that is, the in- 
tellect naturally tends to know in a general way 
what a thing is. 

(c) In the third part of the thesis we main- 
tain that the formal object of the intellect, in 
man's present state, is the essence or inner rea- 
son of sensible things; that is, the intellect can 
have totally positive and direct concepts of those 
objects only which are perceived by the senses. 
Spiritual beings, such as the human soul, God, 
and the like, are known only by inference, an- 
alogy and negativo-positive concepts. 

Part I — The Material Object of the Intellect Is 
Every Being. 

Proof — The material object of the intellect is 
that of which the intellect can obtain some knowl- 
edge. 

But the intellect can in some measure obtain 
knowledge of every being. 

Proof of the Minor — 1. The power of cog- 
nition of a faculty is in proportion to its elevation 
above the conditions of matter. The higher the 
elevation above matter is, the higher also is the 
power of cognition. 

But the human intellect is by its nature spiritual 
and, as such, above the conditions of matter. 
Therefore, too, the power of cognition is above 
the conditions of matter. 



102 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

But if the power of cognition of the intellect is 
above the conditions of matter, it cannot be re- 
stricted in its operations to the perception of ma- 
terial objects, but can cognize, at least in some 
way, all things, the material and the spiritual. 

2. Our experience tells us that there is no 
being which the intellect by the acts of appre- 
hension, judgment and reasoning, cannot appre- 
hend if the object is properly proposed to it. 

Part II — The Formal Object of the Intellect Is 
the Essence Or Inner Reason of Things. 

Proof — The natural tendency of a faculty in- 
dicates what is its formal object. 

But the intellect, as its name implies (intus- 
legere), tends by its nature to penetrate into the 
essence or inner reason of things, into that which 
makes them what they are. 

Pari /// — The Formal Object of the Intellect 
in Man's Present State Is the Essence of Sensible 
Things. 

Proof — The formal object of the intellect in 
man's present state comprises all those objects 
which are directly apprehended by the intellect 
and represented by it according to their proper 
notes and characteristics, and by reason of which 
all other things are recognized. 

But it is matter of experience that the immedi- 
ate and direct objects of intellectual knowledge 
are the abstract, universalized essences of sensible 
things, perceived by the senses and represented 
by the imagination. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 103 

Proof of the Minor — The intellect is determined 
to action by sensation, and sensation, by material 
objects. 

Thus, the child's first judgments are about ma- 
terial things. So likewise in our abstract rea- 
soning we recur to material objects for illustra- 
tion of our concepts. 

Moreover, the words we use to express, and the 
images in the imagination which accompany our 
loftiest thoughts, are originally drawn from ma- 
terial phenomena. 

Finally, those who are deficient from birth in 
any one sense are without direct knowledge of 
the corresponding object. The maxim, therefore, 
is true: "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius 
fuerit in sensu" — "nothing is in the intellect which 
has not been previously perceived by the senses." 

Note — It is evident that our concepts of ma- 
terial objects are completely different from the 
sensitive representations of them. Thus, if we 
describe a circle, sight perceives and imagination 
pictures the concrete, external characters of this 
particular circle, its ,'€olor, size, position, etc., 
whilst the intellect forms the concept of what 
constitutes a circle anywhere and everywhere, in- 
dependently of all relations of time, space, etc. 
Sense perceives the individual, the accidental, the 
concrete; the intellect apprehends the essential, 
the necessary, the universal, regarding the same 
object. 

Thesis 4 — The Intellect Is a Spiritual Faculty, Es- 
sentially Different From the Sense-Faculties. 

Statement of the Question — 1. The intellect 



104 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

is a spiritual faculty capable of recognizing the 
innermost nature of things. 

A spiritual faculty is one which is intrinsically 
independent of matter, in its existence and its 
operations. 

Dependence on matter is intrinsic when the 
faculty exercises its activities through an organ 
as a partial cause; thus, the senses. 

Dependence on matter is extrinsic when the 
concurrence of the organ in the activity of the 
faculty is only a condition. In this latter sense 
is the intellect dependent on a material organ. 

We may also define the intellect as the faculty 
which apprehends immaterial things and material 
things in an immaterial manner. 

2. The question here is whether there is an 
essential or only an accidental difference between 
the intellect and the sense-faculties. 

An essential difference is one which places in- 
tellectual cognitions in an entirely different order 
from the sense-perceptions, whilst an accidental 
difference would establish merely a greater de- 
gree of complexity in intellectual cognitions. 

3. Opponents. The thesis is opposed to Sen- 
sism, Positivism, Materialism, Empiricism, etc. 

These philosophical views, though differing to 
some extent, are one in the doctrine that all knowl- 
edge is ultimately of a sensuous nature. 

4. Since a faculty is specified by its own acts 
and proper objects, the question whether man's 
intellect is essentially different from the sense- 
faculties, may be put thus: does man know ob- 
jects which are essentially different from the 
proper objects of sense-perception? 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 105 

Proof — 1. A faculty which apprehends imma- 
terial objects and material objects in an imma- 
terial manner is spiritual and therefore essential- 
ly different from the sense-faculties. 

But the intellect apprehends such objects. 
Therefore. 

Proof of the Major — Faculties whose objects 
are essentially different, are themselves essential- 
ly different. 

But, immaterial objects, and material objects 
apprehended in an immaterial way, are essential- 
ly different from material objects and objects 
apprehended in a material way. 

Now, the sense-faculties can perceive only ma- 
terial objects and that only in a material manner, 
as is evident from the nature of sensation. 

Proof of the Minor — 1. From the Objects of 
Cognition. 

The intellect has the power to form concepts 
of God, the human soul, being-in-general, the 
transcendental attributes of being, existence, pos- 
sibility, cause and effect, right and duty, virtue 
and vice, truth, etc. 

But all these objects are immaterial. 

2. From the Manner in Which the Intellect 
Apprehends Material Objects. 

The intellect can grasp the essence or inner 
reason of things, conceiving them as abstracted 
from all individual, concrete surroundings, and as 
applicable to all individuals of the same class; 
in other words, the intellect can conceive them 
as universal. 



106 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

But the essence or inner reason of material ob- 
jects cannot be known as applicable to all individ- 
uals of the same class, unless it is known in an 
immaterial manner. 

Proof 2. — From the Act of Self-Consciousness. 

Self -consciousness is an act which is essentially 
above the scope of the senses. 

Now, the intellect can perform acts of self- 
consciousness. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — That man has the power 
of reflex consciousness, is evident from interior 
experience. We know that we can make our acts 
and ourselves the object of our thoughts. 

Proof of the Major — Self-consciousness is not 
only an act of the mind that makes us aware of 
our present internal states, but is also a faculty 
by which we can reflect upon our acts and know 
ourselves to be the cause and source of them. I 
know that I am acting in such and such a man- 
ner. 

But, the sensitive faculties are not capable of 
acts of reflection, nor can they make themselves 
the object of their own activity. 

For, by reason of their organic nature, the sen- 
sitive faculties are immersed in matter and wholly 
dependent on it. 

Furthermore, a material faculty cannot divide 
itself in such a way that the divided parts are 
identical with the whole. 

In the act of self-consciousness, however, the 
Ego reflecting is distinguished from the Ego re- 
flected upon, yet in such a manner that both are 
the same and identical Ego. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 107 

Note — When we say that the intellect is a 
spiritual faculty, we do not imply thereby that 
it is in no way dependent on the organism. So 
long as the soul vivifies and informs the body, 
the stimulation of the organic faculty is pre- 
requisite for intellectual activity. This depend- 
ence of the intellect on the organism is extrinsic. 

In order to show that thought is a function of 
the brain, Materialists construct theories on 
phrenology, the facial angle, physiognomy, etc. 
All that these theories prove, in the supposition 
that they are true, is that the intellect in its ac- 
tivity is in some way dependent on the concur- 
rence of the organic faculty, a fact that we admit. 

Article 2. The Genesis of Intellectual 
Ideas. 

I— ERRONEOUS THEORIES. 

Thesis 5 — The Theory of Sensism, Platonic Ideal- 
ism, Ontologism, Innate Ideas and Traditional- 
ism, Are Erroneous Explanations of the Gen- 
esis Or Origin of Intellectual Ideas. 

Statement of the Question — In the preceding 
article we saw that certain mental products are 
essentially distinct from those of our sensuous 
faculties and that they must, consequently, be due 
to some higher power of the soul. 

The next question is: How are these super- 
sensuous results effected? 

The answer to the question comprises the prob- 
lem of the origin of intellectual ideas. 

We shall first briefly refute the erroneous views 



108 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

and then establish the explanation of the School- 
men, 

A. The Theory of Sensism. 

Statement of the Question. Sensism is the very 
general theory that thought has not an object 
different from that of sentience and that, accord- 
ingly, sense-experience is quite adequate alone to 
account for all our intellectual knowledge. It is 
also called Empericism, and comprises the follow- 
ing three phases of development in modern phil- 
osophy : 

1. Sensationalism denies the existence of a 
radical distinction between the concept and the 
sense-image. If they differ at all it is not by a 
difference of nature but of degree ; that is to say, 
the concept is only another form, a more or less 
complex transformation, of a sensation. 

To this system is allied the Psychology of As- 
sociation, or Associationism, which puts forward 
the factor of association to account for this trans- 
formation of sensations. 

2. Sensationalism, pushed to its ultimate con- 
clusions, has become Materialism. This is a denial 
on principle of the existence of anything that is 
not purely and simply material. 

3. Positivism is less direct than Materialism 
in its denials, but it professes a complete ignor- 
ance of whatever is supersensuous. On this ac- 
count it has justly earned for itself the name of 
Agnosticism. Its fundamental tenet is that ob- 
servation and experiment can never penetrate be- 
yond phenomena or facts that are either simul- 
taneous or successive, and that those realities 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 109 

which metaphysics demands beyond these facts 
the mind does not only not know but is incapable 
of knowing. 

Refutation — Consciousness clearly tells us that 
we have ideas that cannot be acquired through the 
senses alone and that cannot be derived directly 
from sense-perception. 

B. Platonic Idealism. 

Explanation. According to Plato what the hu- 
man mind contemplates as "ideas" are in reality 
the pure essences of things, what in things is one, 
eternal and absolute. Further he conceives these 
ideas as having a real existence apart from 
things, so that the object of the intellect consists 
in real universals. 

The way our present knowledge of them is ac- 
counted for is by the supposition of a pre-natal 
existence during which the soul was in contact 
with them, and that in the present existence the 
person from his birth has retained remembrances 
of them; thus they are rightly termed innate 
ideas. 

Refutation — Plato lays undue emphasis upon 
the features of universality, eternity and immu- 
tability presented by our abstract concepts. Since 
he finds them in evident contradiction to sensu- 
ous perception, where everything is variable and 
fleeting, he asserts that the only explanation lies 
in the supposition of a real world of ideas where 
they exist as universal independent of and prior 
to our experience of them. 

Plato never realized that these universal ideas 
which are independent of time and space are first 



110 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY' 

abstracted from the data of experience and subse- 
quently attributed by acts of reflection to the 
particular subjects in which they are verified. 

C. Ontologism. 

Explanation. The theory of Ontologism holds 
that we have an immediate and intuitive knowl- 
edge of God. This intuitive knowledge of God 
is the principle of all intellectual cognition. God 
is the light in which we recognize all things. 
(Malebranche, Gioberti, Rosmini, Brownson.) 

Refutation. Ontologism essentially means that 
we have an intuitive and direct knowledge of 
God. 

But this assumption is false. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — 1. If we had this intui- 
tive knowledge of God, by the fact that it would 
be an internal cognitive act, it would necessarily 
be recorded by consciousness. 

But the most careful reflection fails to reveal 
the alleged intuition of God. 

2. The intuition of God in relation to our 
knowledge of creatures would imply a direct 
knowledge of God's essence. 

But in this life we have no direct knowledge of 
God's essence. 

3. Experience proves that all our knowledge 
starts from the sensuous perception of material 
things, and from these our analogical concepts of 
spiritual things are formed by abstraction and ex- 
clusion of imperfections incompatible with an in- 
finite Being. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 111 

D. The Theory of Innate Ideas. 

Explanation. A characteristic of many phil- 
osophers, who exaggerate the spirituality of the 
soul, is to unduly exaggerate the opposition be- 
tween the mind and the body. Supersensuous 
mental products, such as ideas of being, unity, 
the true, the good, the necessary, the immutable, 
etc., cannot, these philosophers maintain, have 
arisen by sensuous observation; they must, con- 
sequently, have been innate, inborn in the mind 
from the beginning antecedently to all acquired 
knowledge. 

Advocates of this theory in varied form were 
Descartes, Leibnitz, Rosmini, Kant, etc. 

Refutation — That theory is an erroneous ex- 
planation of the genesis of ideas which is (a) 
gratuitous, (b) contrary to experience, (c) illog- 
ical. 

But such is the theory of innate ideas. There- 
fore. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) The Theory Is 
Gratuitous. 

Man's intellectual knowledge can be satisfac- 
torily explained by the combined action of the 
senses and the intellect. 

(b) The Theory Is Contrary to Experience. 

It is quite beyond doubt that no one has had 
his ^ind stocked from the dawn of his existence 
with ready-made ideas. On the contrary, it is a 
well-attested fact of internal experience that the 
first state of the human mind is one of pure po- 
tentiality, different even from that of habitual 
knowledge, and this fact is irreconcilable with 
the existence of innate ideas. 



112 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(c) The Theory Is Illogical. 

If we have innate ideas they are presumably 
for us to make use of in knowing external things. 

Yet, the application of such an idea to an ex- 
ternal thing, the discovery that it is realized in it, 
can only be an act of recognition, and if we can 
re-cognize the idea in the object why cannot we 
cognize it there straightway? For we can and do 
cognize our ideas by the process of abstraction. 

E. Traditionalism. 

Explanation. Traditionalism teaches that our 
ideas cannot be explained in any other way ex- 
cept by tradition of some primitive revelation. 

Some extend their doctrine to all our ideas, 
others restrict it to the origin of ideas which con- 
cern things spiritual, religious and moral. 

Some maintain that it is physically impossible 
to have any ideas without tradition, whilst others 
say that it is morally impossible. 

Extreme Traditionalism was proposed by De 
Bonald and elaborated by Bautain. De Bonald 
teaches that revelation is the only source of hu- 
man knowledge. Hence, he asserts the physical 
impossibility of acquiring any ideas by the native 
activity of the intellect. We obtain our ideas by 
the tradition of revelation. . 

Bautain so modified extreme Traditionalism 
that he denied innate ideas and maintained that 
ideas are begotten by words. 

Modified Traditionalism. Bonnetty admits that 
the intellect can by its own activity acquire ideas, 
but not of spiritual, religious and moral things. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 113 

These latter ideas are impossible physically with- 
out the means of revelation handed down. 

G. Ventura declared that it is morally im- 
possible to obtain clear ideas of spiritual, relig- 
ious and moral things except through revelation 
and its tradition. 

Proposition One : Words Do Not Beget Nor 
Arouse any Idea in the Sense of the Tradition- 
alists. 

Proof — Words are materially uttered sounds 
which of themselves have no connection between 
the ideas they signify, but receive their meaning 
from the convention and arbitrary agreement of 
men. 

But material sounds of this nature cannot (a) 
beget or arouse ideas, (b) as a matter of fact do 
not do so. Therefore 

Proof of the Minor — (a) The free convention 
of man cannot determine the meaning of material 
sounds unless man previous to the agreement has 
ideas he wishes to express. 

(b) When one listens to an unknown lan- 
guage, the words do not beget or arouse ideas, 
even though the listener has ideas corresponding 
to those the speaker desires to convey. 

Proposition Ttvo : Hence the Doctrine of Tra- 
ditionalism Cannot Be Admitted. 

Proof — The tradition of revelation is a wholly 
unsuited means to acquire ideas. Therefore. 

1. Admitting the physical impossibility of ob- 
taining any ideas by the native exercise of the in- 
tellect, the Traditionalist cannot explain the or- 



114 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

igin of ideas in any other way than that words 
beget or arouse ideas. But this, as we saw, can- 
not be admitted. 

2. The transmission of revelation cannot be 
a source of knowledge without antecedent and 
certain knowledge of the preambles of faith — 
the existence of God, the possibility and fact of 
revelation. In other words, man must have sure 
knowledge of at least some religious and moral 
truths. These truths, therefore, cannot depend 
on tradition. 

Note — The origin of language. 

We consider the question here as it is discussed 
among Catholic writers. We may ask a twofold 
question : 

1. Could man of his natural power and by 
himself create a primitive language? 

2. If so, did the first man invent language or 
was it divinely infused? 

As to the first question the more common opin- 
ion holds that man because of his inborn faculty 
and inclination to manifest ideas could have in- 
vented language. 

As to the second question, some think that lan- 
guage was revealed, whilst others believe that man 
invented language with the assistance of God. 

II. THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY. 

Thesis 6 — The Cognitive Intellect Is a Passive 
Faculty, Which Is Determined to the Act of 
Intellection by a Double Cause, Namely, the 
Active Intellect and the Phantasm, Which by 
Their Joint Action Produce, As a Prerequisite 
of Intellection, a Conceptual Determinant. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 115 

Statement of the Question — 1. General Sketch 
of the Scholastic Theory. At the root of the prob- 
lem of the origin of ideas lies the fact that the 
formal object of intellectual knowledge is differ- 
ent from that of sense-knowledge. The questioii 
is how to account for this supersensuous object. 

Aristotle held the theory that in the beginning 
the state of the mind may be compared to an un- 
inscribed tablet. By his intellect man is capable 
of knowing, but the faculty itself does not provide 
him with knowledge. Potentiality precedes ac- 
tuality. In itself man's intellect is "intellectus 
possiblis," meaning that there is the power of 
knowledge before there is actual knowledge. 

Moreover, this power is passive or receptive and 
is not sufficient by itself to determine itself to act. 
To be brought into exercise it requires some sort 
of completion, which has been called by Aristotle 
and the Schoolmen "species intelligibilis im- 
pressa," or, as it may be translated, a conceptual 
determinant, because it must produce in the fac- 
ulty a modification or determination which makes 
an intellectual act immediately possible. 

The intellect must, therefore, be modified so 
that it may produce an abstract representation of 
the essence of the thing which exists individual- 
ized in the phantasm. To bring about this im- 
material effect or modification, there must be 
some immaterial efficient cause which acts in 
concert with the phantasm. 

This principal efficient cause of the conceptual 
determinant, required to account for the actuation 
of the intellect, is called by the Schoolmen the 
active intellect. As operative under the superior 



116 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

control of this active faculty the phantasm is an 
instrumental cause in the wider sense of the term. 

The combined action of the active intellect and 
the phantasm is adequate to move the cognitive 
intellect to an act of intellection. 

Consequently, as soon as the cognitive intellect 
is determined by their conjoint action, it cannot 
but respond by an act of cognition; it knows the 
essence of a thing, what it is in the abstract apart 
from its particular concrete qualifications. 

2. Explanation of the Terms, (a) The ac- 
tive intellect is an active power whereby the cog- 
nitive intellect is modified so as to recognize in a 
spiritual manner what is concretely depicted in 
the phantasm. 

It is called intellect not because it performs the 
act of intellection but because it renders the ob- 
ject proportionate to the cognitive or passive in- 
tellect. It is called active because in conjunction 
with the phantasm it produces the conceptual de- 
terminant. 

(b) The conceptual determinant is the modi- 
fication or determination of the cognitive intellect 
required before it can know. It is a mental like- 
ness of the essence of the thing which determines 
the cognitive intellect to its act. 

This likeness, however, is not the formal like- 
ness but only a virtual likeness, which leads to 
the formal likeness of the object, that is, to the 
expression by the cognitive intellect of the con- 
formity of its act with the object. 

(c) The cognitive or passive intellect is the 
faculty which expresses the formal likeness of the 
object, that is, the conformity of the faculty with 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 117 

the object; it is the faculty which performs the 
act of intellection. 

(d) A phantasm is a picture of a concrete, 
material object in the imagination. 

3. Is there a real distinction betiveen the active 
and the passive intellect? 

Some authors say that there is a real distinction 
between the active and the passive intellect. They 
are different for the reason that their acts are 
specifically different. The active intellect is an 
efficient cause, the principal cause of the con- 
ceptual determinant, whilst the passive intellect 
when duly determined by the conceptual deter- 
minant accomplishes the act of knowledge. (So 
Mercier and others.) 

Others are opposed to this multiplication of fac- 
ulties. They hold that the active and the passive 
intellect designate only two different aspects of 
one and the same power; accordingly they are 
only virtually distinct. 

4. It may be well to insist on a very important 
distinction : the conceptual determinant is not the 
thing which the cognitive intellect apprehends, 
but that through which the intellect cognizes the 
object. 

We shall divide the thesis into a number of 
propositions. 

First Proposition: The Cognitive Intellect Is 
a Passive Faculty. 

Proof — From Experience. A child who has not 
yet learned the elements of arithmetic has the 
power or faculty of some day understanding the 



118 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

relation of equality in the proposition "seven plus 
five equal twelve." 

The master who teaches the child, at the mo- 
ment of teaching him, has an actual cognition of 
this intellectual truth. When the lesson is fin- 
ished both master and pupil may occupy them- 
selves with other thoughts, but they may remain 
informed of this arithmetic truth, with the result 
that they can think of it again at will. 

This example of a class of facts proves our 
proposition inasmuch as it shows that there are 
three stages in our knowledge : the radical capac- 
ity, the act of understanding, and the permanent 
possession or habit of knowledge. 

In order to pass from the state of mere capac- 
ity to that of actual intellection, the faculty must 
clearly be determined. 

Hence, whilst the cognitive intellect is a prin- 
ciple of action, it is one that stands in need of an 
intrinsic determination or complement to be able 
to exercise its action, that is, it is a passive power. 

Second Proposition : The Conceptual Determi- 
nant Is Necessary to Determine the Passive In- 
tellect to Its Cognitive Act. 

Proof — In order that the intellect may be the 
adequate principle of cognition with regard to 
any object, it must be determined to intellection 
in some manner. 

Now, this determination cannot be effected sole- 
ly by the phantasm. For, the phantasm is ma- 
terial and a material cause cannot intrinsically 
determine a spiritual faculty. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 119 

It must then be brought about by the conceptual 
determinant. For, the object must be brought 
into union with the passive intellect by means of 
a spiritual likeness of the object which is re- 
ceived by the passive intellect and is the means 
by which it is determined to the act of intellection. 

Third Proposition : The Active Intellect Is the 
Principal Efficient Cause of the Conceptual De- 
terminaiit. 

Proof — ^The principal cause must be in pro- 
portion to the effect produced. But the conceptual 
determinant, which is the effect, is spiritual. 
Therefore the principal cause must also be spirit- 
ual. But, the active intellect is the only assign- 
able spiritual cause. Therefore. 

Fourth Proposition: The Phantasm Is An In- 
strumental Cause in the Wider Sense of the Term,. 

Note — ^The phantasm must also concur in the 
production of the conceptual determinant. It is 
necessary 

(a) in order that the active intellect may 
produce this likeness rather than another ; 

(b) to explain why this likeness represents 
this object rather than another. 

We hold that the phantasm concurs in the pro- 
duction of the conceptual determinant as instru- 
mental cause in the wider sense of the term. 

Proof — The phantasm produces the conceptual 
determinant either (a) as principal cause, or 
(b) as instrumental cause in the strict sense, 
or (c) as instrumental cause in the wider sense. 



120 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

But it does not produce the conceptual determi- 
nant as the principal cause nor as the instru- 
mental cause in the strict sense. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — 1. The Phantasm Is Not 
the Principal Cause. 

We already proved that the active intellect is 
the principal cause. 

2. The Phantasm Is Not An Instrumental 
Cause in the Strict Sense. 

An instrumental cause in the strict sense must 
concur directly in producing the effect. 

But the phantasm does not concur directly in 
the production of the conceptual determinant be- 
cause the phantasm is material and the conceptual 
determinant is spiritual. 

3. The Phantasm Is An Instrumental Cause 
in the Wider Sense. 

In order that the phantasm may concur in the 
production of the conceptual determinant as an 
instrumental cause in the wider sense it must (a) 
be so elevated that it may concur in producing an 
effect which it cannot produce by itself; (b) it 
must concur efficiently; (c) it must do so in- 
directly. 

But the phantasm does so concur. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) The phantasm can 
be elevated through the principal cause, which is 
ultimately the soul. The conceptual determinant 
has a twofold causality — spirituality, which it de- 
rives from the active intellect, and representa- 
tiveness of a concrete object, which it obtains 
from the phantasm. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 121 

(b) The phantasm concurs efficiently by giv- 
ing the conceptual determinant the determination 
of "thisness." 

(c) As has been repeatedly said, the phan- 
tasm cannot concur directly ; however, it can con- 
cur indirectly by means of the soul. 

For, all the faculties of man are radicated and 
rooted in the soul as in the ultimate principle of 
vegetative, sensitive and rational life. Hence the 
same soul is the last principle of the phantasm 
and the conceptual determinant. Both are, to use 
an illustration, the offspring of the same parent, 
and there exists a physical sympathy between 
them because they are united through the same 
soul. 

Fifth Proposition: When Determined to Ac- 
tion the Intellect Apprehends What a Thing Is. 

Proof — This proposition follows from the pre- 
ceding ones. The faculty of the understanding is 
at first passive, without the power of moving it- 
self to action. Once, however, it is determined 
in the manner described above, it has everything 
required for it to come into action ; it knows or 
expresses in its intellectual way the idea or what 
a thing is. 

Note — The first notion the mind expresses to 
itself thus under the combined causality of the 
phantasm and the active intellect is the repre- 
sentation of an abstract idea. It becomes uni- 
versal when the mind has reflected upon the ab- 
stract thought-product and when, seeing it 
stripped of all individualizing notes, it finds it 
can represent an indefinite number of individual 
subjects, that it is applicable to each of them 
inasmuch as it verifies what is common to all. 



122 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER II 

THE WILL 

Article 1. The Existence and Object 
OF THE Will. 

Thesis 7 — The Rational Appetite, Or Will, Is Es- 
sentially Superior to the Sensitive Appetite. 
Its Formal Object Is the Good As Apprehended 
by the Intellect. 

Statement of the Question- — 1. Appetite, as we 
know, signifies an internal inclination or ten- 
dency of a being towards what is suitable to or 
perfective of its nature. 

It is twofold: natural and elicited. 

By natural appetite we mean the tendency im- 
planted in all finite beings in virtue of which 
they are impelled towards what is suitable to their 
natures, independently of cognition of any kind 
on their part. 

Elicited appetite is an attraction towards or 
aversion from an object following upon cognition 
of the object by the being. 

It is twofold : rational and sensitive. 

The object of the sensitive appetite is the sen- 
sible good, whilst the object of the rational ap- 
petite is the intellectual good. The rational ap- 
petite is called will. 

2. The will may be defined as the spiritual 
faculty which inclines toivards an object intel- 
lectually apprehended as good; or, the will is the 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 123 

power of loving, desiring and enjoying that which 
is apprehended as good by the intellect. 

3. The Object of the Will. 

The material object of any faculty is the object 
as it is with all its accompanying notes. 

The formal object is the material object with 
regard to those notes only which are attained by 
the faculty. 

The material object of the will is every being, 
whilst the formal object of the will is the good as 
apprehended by the intellect and proposed by it 
to the will as indifferently appetible. 

The range of the will, therefore, is co-extensive 
with that of the intellect. The adequate object 
of the intellect, as we proved before, is every 
being. Now, every being as being is good ; so that 
whatsoever is can be apprehended as good, and 
hence everything that is can become the object of 
the will. 

On the other hand, an object, however perfect 
in itself, if presented to the will as lacking in any- 
thing short of the absolutely perfect good and so 
apprehended by the intellect, will not satisfy the 
capacity of the will and cannot, therefore, necessi- 
tate its desire and love. 

Whilst an object which comprises all good, if 
presented to the will as such, will satisfy all its 
capacity and will, consequently, be necessarily 
loved. 

4. Definition and Division of the Good. 

The good is defined by Aristotle as the object 
which every being desires, to which it naturally 
tends. 



124 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(a) The sensible good is the object of desire 
arising from a sense-perception or sense-estima- 
tion. This sensible good is always a concrete 
thing. 

(b) The abstract good is that in a thing which 
precisely constitutes its goodness. The desire en- 
gendered by this knowledge has for its proper 
object not the concrete good, but the good as such, 
that by reason of which concrete things are desir- 
able and worthy to ibe sought. 

(c) The universal good is the ideal good which 
comprises in itself all that is good in particular 
objects. 

(d) The absolute good is an object considered 
good in itself. 

(e) The useful good is an object considered as 
good not in itself but as leading towards an ul- 
terior good. 

(f ) The agreeable good is the subjective pleas- 
ure accruing from the possession of a good object. 

5. The Opponents. The opponents of this 
thesis are all those who declare that the will is 
not superior to the forces of matter, as also all 
those who confound the sensuous appetite and the 
rational appetite, claiming that both are essential- 
ly the same. 

Part I — The Will Is Essentially Superior to the 
Sensitive Appetite. 

Proof — The will is a faculty which strives after 
and inclines towards immaterial objects and after 
material objects in an immaterial manner. 

But such a faculty is essentially superior to the 
sensitive appetite. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 125 

Proof of the Majo7' — 1. Consciousness is wit- 
ness that we long for and desire God, happiness, 
virtue, truth, science, power, honor, etc., objects 
which cannot be pictured in any sense-perception. 

2. From consciousness we also know that we 
strive after and incHne towards material objects 
which are not pleasing to sensuous nature, simply 
because the intellect presents them as good under 
supersensible aspects ; e. g., the pain of an opera- 
tion. 

3. Again, consciousness bears testimony that 
we may, and frequently do, reject objects most 
attractive to sense for the sake of an immaterial 
end, e. g., for the sake of virtue, duty, friendship, 
etc. 

Proof of the Minor — 1. Such a faculty exer- 
cises itself with regard to objects which are es- 
sentially different from those of the sensuous 
order. For the o'bjects of the sensitive appetite 
are the sensible good, concrete, individual, ma- 
terial things; whilst the will has for its object 
the immaterial and spiritual. 

2. Besides, such a faculty tends towards an 
object in a manner which is essentially superior 
to the manner of sensitive appetition. For, the 
sensitive appetite, because material, can desire its 
object only in a material way, whilst the will de- 
sires an object in an immaterial way. 

Part II — The Formal Object of the Will Is the 
Good As Apprehended by the Intellect. 

Proof — That is the formal object of a faculty 
on account of which it naturally operates. 



126 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

But the good as apprehended by the intellect 
is the reason why the will operates. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — The reason why the will 
acts may be either (a) evil as evil, (b) some- 
thing which is neither good nor evil, (c) the 
intellectually apprehended good. 

But it cannot act on account of (a) or (b). 
Therefore. 

1. The will cannot act on account of evil as 
evil. For evil is not a positive entity. Therefore, 
it cannot be the reason why the will acts. 

2. The will cannot act on account of an object 
which is neither good nor evil, for that which la 
indifferent cannot remove the natural indeter- 
mination of the will. 

Therefore the reason why the will acts is the 
good as apprehended by the intellect. 

Article 2. Liberty of the Will. 
A. EXISTENCE OF LIBERTY 

Thesis S—The Will Is Free. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Idea and Defini- 
tion of Freedom. 

In general freedom means exemption from 
something. However, since freedom is usually 
applied to the activity of a living agent, it means 
the immunity of an agent from some restraining 
force. If we consider the various kinds of re- 
straining forces from which a being might be 
free, we distinguish three kinds of freedom : 

(a) Freedom from external restraint, or free- 
dom of spontaneous action. In this sense the 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 127 

activities of animals are said to be free inasmuch 
as their movements are not impeded by an oppos- 
ing physical agent or force — a lion in the wild is 
free in this sense, but not free when confined 
to a cage. 

(b) Freedom from moral restraint is the im- 
munity of an agent from the moral obligation im- 
posed by a lawful superior. In the strictest sense 
this freedom is found only in God. The restraint 
of law is a just and due restraint in the case of 
man. 

In a limited sense, however, man is free in this 
regard concerning those actions which are not 
prescribed or forbidden by law. In this sense we 
speak of political freedom, freedom of religion 
and conscience, etc. 

(c) Freedom from internal necessity, or free- 
dom of choice means not only freedom from ex- 
ternal restraint but the absence also of that ne- 
cessitation which controls the activities of all ma- 
terial beings, the inanimate, the organic and sen- 
sitive. 

Freedom of choice may be divided into : 

(a) Freedom of contradiction, which is the 
power of willing or not willing ; 

(b) Freedom of specification, which is the 
power of choosing between actions which are 
specifically distinct. 

The essence of liberty lies in the freedom of 

contradiction. The freedom of specification is 

nothing else than an exercise of the freedom of 

contradiction with regard to particular lines of 
action. 



128 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The will as a free power may be defined as 
the power of self-determination. 

Freedom of choice may be defined as that eyi- 
doivment of the will in virtue of which, when all 
conditions prerequisite for action are present, it 
may act or not act, may act in this ivay or another. 

There is only one faculty which is free, the 
will. All other faculties are governed by ne- 
cessity. Of course, we sometimes call them free, 
but this is by extrinsic denomination, inasmuch as 
these faculties may become objects of free choice. 

We do not assert that ail the acts of the will 
are free. The question is whether any act of the 
will is free. "Many of man's acts are not free. 
Control over our thoughts ceases during sleep ; 
and even when awake, independently of automatic 
movements, such as breathing, winking, etc., we 
perform many acts not clearly realized in con- 
sciousness. A long train of thoughts may thus 
have passed through our mind before we, by an 
act of self-consciousness, advert to the fact and 
become aware that, although hitherto it has been 
deliberate, henceforth it is free, and we are re- 
sponsible for it." 

An act of volition in the strict sense, therefore, 
implies the following elements : 

(a) conception of some oDJect as good or de- 
sirable ; 

(b) advertence to the possibility of alterna- 
tive courses of action ; 

(c) a judicial act of preference; 

(d) the consequent active tendency of the 
will towards that side. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 129 

2. Opponents, (a) Materialists destroy the 
subject and root of the freedom of the will by 
claiming that all life is the result of physico- 
chemical forces. 

(b) Deter'mininism is the theory that the will 
is not free and that all our acts, even including 
those apparently free, are adequately and inev- 
itably determined by their antecedents. 

According to the nature of the antecedents 
which are held to account for our actions deter- 
minism is variously denominated. 

Mechanical determinism is not distinguishable 
from fatalism ; it makes the will a material force 
subject like everything else to inexorable me- 
chanical laws. 

Physiological determinism likens even our 
noblest volitions to reflex action. 

Psychological determinism is the theory that 
the will necessarily follows the strongest motive, 
or what is presented to it as the greatest good. 

(c) Modern psychologists quite commonly do 
not deny that men generally have or seem to have 
a perception of liberty, but they claim that this 
conviction is an illusion. 

William James gives typical expression to this 
view. He claims that the question about freedom 
may be viewed in a threefold way; (a) experi- 
mentally, (b) scientifically, (c) morally. In the 
first case the question cannot be solved, because 
the testimony of consciousness and introspection 
is "too crude." Ultimately all depends on as- 
sociation, and association depends entirely on re- 
flex mechanism, and introspection cannot reveal 
whether the will can interpose. 



130 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Scientifically the question of freedom of the 
will must be denied, because it is against the prin- 
ciple of science which demands uniformity in na- 
ture. 

We must, however, affirm liberty on moral 
grou-nds, because there can be no question of ob- 
ligation without free will. (Gruender, Free Will, 
p. 50 ff.) 

If any one asks how the universal conviction 
of freedom Of the will arose, although the will is 
always determined, the answer is given: causes 
determining our will often elude our conscious- 
ness, or, at least, are not sufficiently observed by 
us. 

3. The Arguments. There are three proofs 
for the freedom of the will: 

(a) The proof from consciousness — the psy- 
chological proof ; 

(b) the proof from ethical considerations — 
the ethical proof ; 

(c) the proof from intrinsic r'eason — the 
metaphysical proof. 

Each of these arguments proves our contention 
beyond a doubt. "If after the due consideration 
of the evidence which our arguments furnished," 
writes Father Gruender, "the verdict is to be that 
man is not free, then we must declare bankruptcy 
not only in philosophy but also in the natural 
sciences ; even our common sense without which 
we cannot perform the most ordinary actions in 
our intercourse with all men, must go." (Gruen- 
der, Free Will.) 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 131 

Proof — 1. The Psychological Proof. 

Note — We immediately experience the Acts of 
the will by consciousness. But this perception is 
such that we conclude immediately to the free- 
dom of the will. 

Consciousness gives unmistakable, constant, ir- 
resistible testimony that there is in us a faculty 
by reason of which we have such control over 
some of our actions that we are free to perform 
them or not to perform them. 

But the unmistakable, constant, irresistible tes- 
timony of consciousness must be admitted as in- 
fallible. Therefore. 

The Major — Every one is conscious of the fact 
that before he acts, whilst he is acting, and after 
he has performed the act, he has control over 
some of these actions. 

(a) Before he acts he deliberates, he reflects 
upon what he ought to do, he considers the mo- 
tives for acting or not acting, etc. 

Moreover, through consciousness man realizes 
that his actions in the case depend on an element 
strictly his own, namely, on free choice; he real- 
izes that it is in the power of the will to determine 
which motive or motives are to prevail. 

Again, consciousness tells man that whilst he 
is deliberating about the course of action he is 
to follow, and actually before he makes his choice, 
he can prolong the time of reflection or come to 
a decision at once. 

(b) Whilst he is acting, man clearly knows 
that the determination to act proceeds from his 
choice; that it is within his power to finish the 



132 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

act begun, or to postpone it at will, or desist from 
it at any time he wishes, even contrary to a pre- 
vious decision. 

(c) After he has performed the action, man 
approves of his action if he has acted aright, he 
enjoys peace of mind and determines to act in 
like manner in the future; whereas, if he has acted 
wrongly, he is sorry, he reproaches himself, he 
determines to act 'better in the future. 

But, approval of an action as well as reproach 
and blame are not given to actions which were 
performed involuntarily or from necessity. 

Proof — 2. The Ethical Proof. 

Statement of the Question — 1. If freedom is 
denied the whole moral order falls. 

Hence, in this argument we ask whether free- 
dom of the will is necessary as a basis of the 
moral order. We take it for granted here that 
there is a moral order as it is commonly under- 
stood by all people, namely, that right, obligation, 
duty, etc., are real things. 

2. We may also put the question as follows : 

(a) If we suppose that the experience of free- 
dom is an illusion, if, accordingly, man's will is 
always bound by the greater attraction, can it be 
said without being absurd that man has rights, 
is bound by obligation, etc.? 

(b) Can those who theoretically deny the free- 
dom of the will be men morally good, if they re- 
duce their theory to practice ? 

We say in reply to the second question that no 
one can carry out this theory in practice with- 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 133 

out being morally bad, and, if this were done 
universally by all men, the entire moral order 
would be destroyed and the foundations of society 
would be subverted. 

3. Terms, (a) Obligation means the moral 
necessity laid on the will by a superior to do or 
omit something. 

(b) Right is a moral, inviolable power to do 
or possess something. 

(c) Imputability is that property of the action 
in virtue of which it may be called one's own. 

(d) Responsibility is that state in man accord- 
ing to which he is worthy of praise or blame, re- 
ward or punishment. 

(e) Punishment is a physical evil inflicted on 
account of a moral evil. 

(f) Reward is a physical good given in re- 
turn for a moral good. 

Proof — ^The moral order is real, that is, there is 
real obligation to perform some actions and to 
omit others, even with the loss of life, honor, for- 
tune, etc. 

There is real right, imputability, responsibility, 
there is an intrinsic distinction between morally 
good actions and bad actions. 

But all these ethical ideas would mean nothing 
if the will is not free. 

Proof of the Minor — (a) There can be no ob- 
ligation, for instance, if I have not the liberty to 
do this or omit that. 

(b) If man's will is not free, his actions are 
no more under his control than are those of the 
animal under its free control. 



134 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

2. A doctrine which cannot be put into prac- 
tice without destroying the moral order is per- 
nicious. 

But the theory which denies the freedom of tho 
will cannot be put into practice without destroy- 
ing the moral order. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — The doctrine of our op- 
ponents put into practice means that man always 
follows the greater attraction. 

But man cannot always follow the greater at- 
traction without being morally bad, since the 
greater attraction is not infrequently bad. 

Consequently, if all men were always to fol- 
low the greater attraction, it is clear that the 
whole moral order would fall to the ground. 

Proof — 3. The Metaphysical Argument. 

In consequence of his rational nature man is 
capable of forming objectively indifferent judg- 
ments, that is, judgments which exhibit the mo- 
tives for aiming at an object or rejecting it, for 
pursuing a certain course of action or not pur- 
suing it. 

But these objectively indifferent judgments 
would have no meaning if man's will is not free. 
Therefore. 

Proof of the Major — In the present life no 
object presents itself as good and attractive under 
all aspects: 

(a) not finite goods. For, besides the very 
limitation they imply by being finite, on account 
of the difficulty of their attainment, the uncer- 
tainty of their possession, etc., there are always 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 135 

some reasons why they are undesirable and on 
account of which man may turn from their pur- 
suit. 

(b) Not God, the infinite good. For, the in- 
adequate and obscure knowledge we have of God 
in this life, the difficulty connected with duty 
and the practice of virtue, the conflict between 
man's pride and sensuality and righteousness, etc., 
make the pursuit of the true and unalloyed good 
disagreeable in many respects to human nature. 

Hence, the intellect can present motives for 
striving after this Supreme Good as well as mo- 
tives for not doing so. In other words, the in- 
tellect can form objectively indifferent judgments 
regarding every good, finite and infinite. 

Proof of the Minor — That man has this power 
we have already observed. 

Now, the intellect is not a faculty gifted with 
freedom. 

Therefore, unless the will is free these ob- 
jectively indifferent judgments would be absolute- 
ly without purpose. Therefore. 

Note — 1. It may be asked: Might not free 
will or the power of choice be impeded by moral 
forces affecting man's rational appetite? Might 
not the fascinating influence of some particular 
object or good be so strong as strictly for the 
time being to overcome man's will? 

This possibility is not excluded. But in that 
case the will, by tending towards such a good, 
would not be free. The act would be an "im- 
pulsive volition," that is, the mere resultant of 
forces playing upon the will — character plus pres- 
ent motives. 



136 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Note— 2. The Control of the Will Over the 
Other Faculties. 

(a) The will can avvlv the intellect, the in- 
ternal and external senses, as also the motor 
powers to action. 

(b) Regarding the judgments of the intellect, 
when the connection between the subject and 
predicate is not self-evident and is apprehended 
as such, our will may find some real or apparent 
good in adopting a particular view on the ques- 
tion. In such a case it can fix the attention of 
the intellect on the reason for that view and on 
the objections against any other and compel the 
assent to the proposition as useful, prudent, 
pleasurable, etc. 

(c) In regard to the sensuous appetite, the 
will can control it indirectly, inasmuch as it can 
control the application of the external and internal 
senses to such objects as would excite sensuous 
desire or aversion. 

Note — 3. The Will and the Intellect. 

The will can seek that only which is good or 
appears to be good. We are so constituted that we 
must be happy and must always seek happiness. 
All our actions together with the volitions on 
which they depend are necessarily directed to this 
end. We may often.be mistaken about the means, 
or the means may be adapted to a partial attain- 
ment of this end, but the object which is ulti- 
mately in view is invariably the greatest amount 
of happiness attainable under the circumstances. 

Therefore, the will is naturally directed towards 
the good. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 137 

Hence, too, its freedom must lie in the power 
to identify or refuse to identify the motives with 
the good towards which it is naturally directed. 

But the will and the intellect are distinct fac- 
ulties, and we must not confuse the functions of 
the one with those of the other. 

It is the function of the intellect to estimate 
the relative value of the different motives and 
propose them to the will. The will then chooses 
the one which is considered on the whole to be 
the best. 

However, it is the will which initiates our ac- 
tions, mental and physical. Hence, the considera- 
tion of the motives can take place only at the 
bidding of the will. 

-We have, then, apparently this peculiar situ- 
ation: the intellect and will obey one another in 
turn. The will commands the intellect to con- 
sider the motives before it, and the intellect de- 
termines the acfion of the will by the report which 
it makes upon them. 

But, before the will can bid the intellect in- 
vestigate, the subject must somehow or other have 
been presented to it. And, since these subjects 
are necessarily intellectual ideas, they must be 
present in the intellect before they can be trans- 
mitted to the will. 

Hence, the freedom of the will is exercised in 
initiating or refusing to initiate the process of 
investigation in regard to any particular motive. 

Note— A. The Will and Evil. 
In the strict sense liberty does not imply the 
power of choosing evil. This power is an imper- 



138 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

fection, just as the power of self-deception is an 
imperfection in our reason. 

A man chooses evil under the guise of good. 
Such an action is possible on account of man's 
possession of many faculties, each of which has 
a different proper object; what is the real good 
of one is not necessarily that of another — as is 
manifest in the case of the higher and lower ap- 
petites, where what is truly the pleasure of the 
lower is sometimes not at all the good of man 
as a rational being. 

When the will seeks an inferior good in place 
of what is upright, it violates the law of its na- 
ture, thereiby acting inconsistently with right 
order and abusing its liberty. Hence a moral evil 
is called a defect, unrighteousness. 

Since the liberty to commit evil is an imper- 
fection of the will, to claim it as a right either 
for one's self or for others is manifestly absurd. 
When, therefore, a legitimately constituted au- 
thority, acting within the limits and observing 
the precautions demanded by prudence, takes 
measures to prevent in the family or in society 
vice or error leading to vice, it is protecting lib- 
erty and not curtailing it. Unbridled liberty is 
no true liberty but license, a counterfeit of it. 



ESSENTIALS OP PSYCHOLOGY 139 

B. NATURE OF FREEDOM. 

Thesis 9 — Every Free Action Must Be Preceded 
By An Objectively Indifferent Judgment, 
Whilst Active Indifference Is Necessary on the 
Part of the Faculty. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Conditions for 
Freedom : 

(a) Consciousness and attention are neces- 
sary. There are, of course, various degrees of 
consciousness and attention, but if they are en- 
tirely absent, there can be no question of freedom. 

(b) The most important condition is intel- 
lectual deliberation, that is, the weighing of mo- 
tives intellectually apprehended. Every free act, 
in other words, must be preceded by an objective- 
ly indifferent judgment. 

2. An objectively indifferent judgment is one 
which proposes the pros and cons, the reasons 
for or against, a definite course of action. It pro- 
poses an object as desirable on the one hand and 
as not desirable on the other. This involves two 
judgments: the one proposes the motives for 
seeking the object intellectually apprehended, the 
other exhibits motives for rejecting it. 

3. By indifference we mean in general that 
property in virtue of which a faculty is not de- 
termined to a particular line of action. Applied 
to the will, it means that endowment in virtue of 
which the will is not restricted to seek a certain 
object in particular, but is able to determine it- 
self; it is nothing else than the power of choice. 



140 ESSENTIALS OP PSYCHOLOGY 

Since the will determines itself, the indifference 
of the will is called active indifference. 

Part I — An Objectively Indifferent Judgment 
Must Precede the Free Action. 

Proof — In order that the will may act freely, 
it is necessary that it be not determined to a cer- 
tain line of action by the object. 

But in order that it may not be determined 
thus by the object, the object must be proposed 
as indifferently appetible. 

Therefore an objectively indifferent judgment 
is required. 

Proof of the Minor — If the object is not pro- 
posed as indifferent, it is proposed either (a) as 
evil in every respect, or (b) as entirely good. 

But if the object is proposed as entirely evil 
the will cannot act, because its formal object is 
the intellectually apprehended good. If the object 
is proposed as completely good, the will is drawn 
towards it by necessity. 

Part II — Active Indifference Is Required on 
the Part of the Faculty. 

Proof — Freedom is a property of the will. 

But if the will is not actively indifferent, the 
will would be determined to action by a cause 
from without. 

But if the will is determined by a cause from 
without it is not free, since the action would not 
be under the control of the will. 

Thoughts Which Will Obviate Some Difficulties. 

1. It is quite clear that it is impossible to act 
without a motive. It may be a good or a bad mo- 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 141 

tive, adequate or inadequate, but without a mo- 
tive of some kind action, and, consequently, voli- 
tion is practically inconceivable. 

2. It is obvious that the strength and influ- 
ence of a motive are very largely determined by 
character ; man's likes and dislikes depend on what 
his character is. 

3. It is also to be admitted that man's char- 
acter is formed to a great extent by experience 
through the acquisition of habits and by heredity. 
But this is not all. There is something involved 
in the constitution of motives which goes far be- 
yond. 

4. Since there is a vast number of objects in 
regard to which all men are disposed alike, it is 
quite true that the action of a number of persons 
in given circumstances can be predicted with 
more or less certainty, according to the extent to 
which the disposition prevails among men. But, 
as the community of interests regarding the mo- 
tive presented decreases, the possibility of pre- 
diction will also decrease. 

5. It is true that God knows all our future 
free actions; but He knows them just as they are 
to be, namely, as free. God's knowledge of such 
actions no more necessitates them than our 
knowledge of what we are freely doing necessi- 
tates our actions. 



142 • ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAPTER III. 

THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 

ITS RELATION TO THE BODY. 

ITS ORIGIN. 

Article 1. The Nature of the Human 

Soul. Its Substantiality, Spirituality, 

Simplicity, and Immortality. 

We have hitherto studied the character of 
thought and volition. We now pass on to en- 
quire into the nature of the principle from which 
these actions proceed. 

By the human soul we understand the subject 
of our mental life, the ultimate principle by which 
we think and will. 

A principle is that from which something pro- 
ceeds; an ultimate principle is the last source. 

Thesis 10 — The Soul Is a Substantial Principle. 

Statement of the Question — That the human 
soul is a substantial principle is evident from what 
we have seen regarding the acts of intellect and 
will. 

Substance is that which exists in itself. 

It is contrasted with accident, or that which 
by its nature exists in another as in its subject 
of inherence. 

When we say that the soul is a substantial prin- 
ciple we mean to say that the soul exists in itself 
and does not require a subject of inherence. 

Proof — Accidents must have a subject in which 
they inhere. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 143 

Now, consciousness clearly tells us that there 
are in us accidental modifications and that there 
is an abiding subject in which they inhere. 

The abiding subject of inherence of these ac- 
cidents is the soul. 

Therefore the soul is a substantial principle. 

Proof of the Mino?' — 1. Consciousness clearly 
testifies that there are in us various accidental 
modifications, a constant sucession of thoughts, 
desires, affections and feelings, and that these 
modifications do not exist in themselves. 

2. At the same time consciousness tell us that 
in the midst of these manifold changes there is 
the thinking subject which remains unchanged. 

Now, this thinking subject is either an accident 
or a substance. If it is an accident, the question 
of inherence recurs indefinitely, since there must 
be a subject in which the accidents inhere. 

Thesis 11 — The Human Soul Is Spiritual. 

Statement of the Question — Spiritual is op- 
posed to material. Material signifies intrinsic 
dependence on an organ, or, in general, on mat- 
ter. 

Spirituality, then, signifies intrinsic independ- 
ence of matter for the faculty's existence and some 
of its operations. 

The attribute of spirituality is sometimes con- 
founded with that of simpHcity. But it is im- 
portant to distinguish the two. By saying that 
a substance is simple we mean that it is not com- 
posed of parts; by saying that it is spiritual we 



144 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

mean that in its existence and in its operations 
it is intrinsically independent of matter. 

The principle of life in animals is an instance 
of a simple principle which is nevertheless not 
spiritual, since it is absolutely dependent on the 
organism. 

Proof — 1. The human soul is the subject of 
various spiritual activities. 

But the subject of spiritual activities must it- 
self be spiritual. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor' — The minor proposition is 
merely an application of the axiom that the opera- 
tion of an agent follows the nature of the agent; 
an act cannot transcend its cause. 

Proof of the Major — 1. From the Spirituality 
of Thought. 

We are capable of apprehending abstract ideas, 
such as truth, unity, etc. We can form ideas of 
purely spiritual beings, such as God. We can un- 
derstand necessary truths. We can apprehend 
possibilities as such. We can see the relation be- 
tween ideas and the logical sequence of conclusions 
from premises. 

But such operations, as has been shown, are 
spiritual phenomena, which must accordingly pro- 
ceed from a spiritual faculty. 

Therefore the soul which is the last source of 
these actions must be spiritual. 

2. Proof From Psychological Reflection. 
The human mind can bend back upon itself and 
reflect. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 145 

But an act of this sort cannot proceed from a 
material agent. Therefore. 

The Major — I recognize the absolute identity 
between myself thinking about something and 
myself reflecting on that thinking Ego. 

Proof of the Minor — ^One part of a material 
substance may be made to act upon another; one 
atom of matter may attract, repel, or in various 
ways influence another; but that precisely the 
same portion of matter should act and be acted 
upon in its own case, is repungnant to all that 
common experience and science teach. 

If, then, this unity of agent and patient, of 
subject and object, is so contrary to the nature of 
matter, assuredly a faculty whose action is in- 
trinsically dependent on matter or an organ can- 
not be capable of self-reflection. 

3. Proof From the Will. 

Our consciousness, history and biography, the 
existence of poetry and romance, overwhelm us 
with evidence of the fact that man is attracted 
not only by the sensuous good but also by the 
supersensuous good. 

But a material principle of action cannot be 
attracted by the supersensuous good. 

Therefore there must be in man a principle of 
action which corresponds to this attraction to the 
supersensuous good. 

The Major — As a matter of fact, love of justice, 
of truth, of virtue, of right for its own sake, etc., 
are motives and impulses which have inspired 
some of the greatest and noblest works in the his- 
tory of the human race. 



.146 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

4. Proof From Freedom. 

We are free. We are capable of self-determin- 
ation, and in the act of free choice we can de- 
liberately reject all that is attractive to sensuous 
desire and can choose that from which the senses 
shrink. 

But an organic faculty cannot thus control or 
coerce the exercise of its own activity. 

Therefore, there must be a spiritual principle 
which is the source of this activity. 

Dependence on Matter. 

Dependence on matter is twofold, intrinsic and 
extrinsic. 

In reference to the soul its dependence on an 
organ is intrinsic when the act elicited proceeds 
from the soul and body as one principle of op- 
eration — such is the case with vegetative and 
sensitive life. 

The dependence is extrinsic when the action 
proceeds from the soul alone as its real principle. 
Although in its union with the body the soul 
cannot perform any act unless the body assists 
in its exercise, yet this dependence is extrinsic 
and does not flow from the very nature of the 
soul. 

Thesis 12 — The Soul Is Simple. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Simplicity 
means absence of composition. 

A thing may be composed physically of two 
kinds of parts — quantitative and essential. 

Quantitative parts are those which occupy space 
and are situated outside of each other. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 147 

Essential or substantial parts are those which 
make up the very reality and nature of the thing. 

The meaning of the proposition that the human 
soul is simple is that the soul has neither quanti- 
tative nor essential parts. 

2. Opponents. W. James, perverts our doctrine 
by saying that the soul is a "detached existence, 
sufficient unto itself." (Principles of Psych., vol. 

I, p. 6.) 

Paulsen and others consider our teaching in the 
sense that the soul has the simplicity of a mathe- 
matical point, which has its seat in a certain part 
of the brain and from there directs the body. 

Dr. Paul Carus, of Chicago, holds that the soul 
is "a kind of ethereal fluid endowed with several 
mystical qualities." 

The objection these men have against us is 
that we cannot express the simplicity of the soul 
except negatively. Hence the query of Paulsen: 
Does the soul consist of negations? 

Proof — 1. From the Simplicity of Ideas. 

The soul is the ultimate principle of intellectual 
ideas. 

But the ultimate principle of intellectual ideas 
must be simple. 

Proof of the Minor — Experience teaches every 
one that he is capable of forming abstract ideas, 
such as truth, being, unity, virtue, etc., ideas which 
by their very nature are simple. 

Now, if the indivisible idea, say of truth, were 
the result of an extended principle, such as the 
brain in the supposition of some, either 



148 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(a) different parts of the idea must belong 
to different parts of the brain; or 

(b) each part of the brain must be the sub- 
ject of the whole idea; or 

(c) the whole idea must belong to a single 
part of the brain. 

But the first is absurd. For, the act by which 
the intellect apprehends the idea of truth, being, 
and the like, is an indivisible act of thought. 

The second assertion is also impossible. For, 
if different parts of the extended principle were 
each the principle of the whole idea, we should 
have at one and the same time not one idea but 
many ideas of the same object. This is evidently 
not the case. 

Thirdly, if the whole idea were located in one 
part of the brain then this part would either be 
simple or composite. Clearly it cannot be simple ; 
if, however, it is composite, then the series of al- 
ternatives will recur until we are forced to admit 
a simple principle. 

Proof — 2. From the Acts of Judgment and 
Reasoning. 

The acts of judgment and reasoning cannot 
take place in an extended subject. Therefore. 

Proof of the Antecedent — Each of these acts 
consists in the comparison the mind makes be- 
tween two objective ideas or propositions, and 
in the consent which is given to their identity or 
diversity or the conclusion drawn from the prem- 
ises. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 149 

Now, in order that comparison may take place 
at all, the things compared must focus in one and 
the same point, whilst the assent is a simple, un- 
divided act. Therefore. 

Proof — 3. From Psychological Reflection. 

The human soul bends back upon itself by an 
act of reflection in such a way that the entire 
thinking principle becomes the object of thought. 

But such an act of reflection would be im- 
possible if the soul were not simple. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — If the parts were not ex- 
tended, a thing which is not possible, each part 
would at best recognize its own proper acts. If 
the parts are extended, there could at best be 
reflection of one part upon the other, but there 
could be no act of reflection of the whole soul 
upon itself, and consequently no recognition of 
the soul. 

Thesis 13 — The Soul Is Immortal. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Immortality, 
etymologically considered, means freedom from 
death. Death signifies the cessation of life. 
Hence, immortality in the positive sense means 
perpetuity of life. 

Immortality may be taken in a threefold sense : 

(a) Essential immortality consists in this that 
it is a contradiction for the being not to exist. 
Clearly this immortality belongs to God alone. 

(b) Gratuitous immortality is the impossi- 
bility of cessation from life which proceeds from 
a preternatural gift of God. 



150 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(c) Natural immortality is that by which the 
soul of its very nature postulates continuance in 
existence after its separation from the body. 
Hence, although the soul depends on God's will 
for its creation and preservation, yet in harmony 
with His ordinary power He cannot deprive it 
of its existence. It is of this immortality we 
speak, in the thesis. 

2. The cessation of life may be brought about 
in either of two ways, by annihilation of the liv- 
ing being, or by corruption of the vital principle. 

Annihilation means the reduction of a thing to 
absolute nothingness. 

Corruption, in the philosophical sense, may be 
twofold : 

(a) essential corruption which signifies the 
dissolution of a being into its constitutive or com- 
ponent parts, as in the death of man, the com- 
bustion of wood, etc. 

(b) accidental corruption takes place indi- 
rectly by the decomposition of the subject on 
which the being depends, as, the disappearance 
of the shape or color from a ball of wax. 

A being, therefore, is incorruptible when it is 
incapable of perishing either by decomposition 
into constitutive parts or by destruction of the 
subject in which it inheres or upon which it de- 
pends for its existence. 

Part I — The Soul Is An Incorruptible Sub- 
stance. 

Proof — We have already proved that the soul 
is a simple and spiritual substance. 



ESSENTIALS OF OPSYCHOLOGY 151 

But a simple substance is incapable of essential 
corruption, because it has no' constitutive parts 
into which it might be resolved ; whilst a spiritual 
substance cannot be corrupted indirectly, since it 
does not depend intrinsically on the body. 

Part II — The Human Soul Continues After 
Death. 

Proof — 1. From Man's Desire for Happiness. 

A natural, irresistible, universal desire which 
is in harmony with the dictates of human reason 
cannot have been implanted in man's nature by 
a perfectly wise and just God with the intention 
of its universal, necessary and final frustration. 

But, unless the soul continues after death, such 
would be the case. Therefore. 

Proof of the Major — That this desire exists is 
evident from our personal experience and the ex- 
perience of others and from the history of the 
whole human race. Moreover, it is clear that 
man's yearning for happiness cannot be satisfied 
by any or all earthly goods. Health, strength, 
beauty, honor, intellectual gifts, etc., fall to the lot 
of few. Even where many of them or all are 
combined, we know that there may be found not 
only absence of happiness but even painful dis- 
content and misery. 

Therefore, anything capable of completely sat- 
isfying the innate desire for happiness is, in the 
present world, beyond the wildest hopes of man. 

Unless, then, we are prepared to predicate folly 
and cruelty of God, we must admit a future ex- 



152 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

istence in which this desire can meet its proper 
object. 

Proof — 2. From the Moral Law. 

God has inscribed His moral law in our rational 
nature, whereby He commands us to do right and 
avoid wrong. 

Moreover, since He is infintely wise, holy and 
just, He must have fortified this law with a per- 
fect sanction. 

But such a perfect sanction is not found in this 
life. 

Therefore it must be found in the next. There- 
fore, too, the human soul must continue to exisL 
after death. 

Proof of the Major — Our own consciousness 
gives us the most intimate testimony that we are 
under such a law. 

Furthermore, the study of the laws, literature 
and religions of peoples, investigation into the 
customs and moral ideas of savage tribes, the re- 
searches in philology, etc., bear witness to the 
universality of ethical conceptions, which are 
based on the moral law. 

Without a sufficient sanction such a law 
would obviously be inadequate and ineffective 
and, therefore, incompatible with the character 
of an all- wise and just law-giver. 

Proof of the Minor — It is a fact of common ob- 
servation and history that a sufficient sanction is 
jiot found in this life. 

For, the goods and evils of this world are often 
distributed inversely to desert. Many self-sac- 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 153 

rificing, virtuous men meet with continual suffer- 
ings and trials, and that during a great portion 
of their lives, whilst many wicked men enjoy 
temporal prosperity to the end. 

This cannot be the final outcome of life. For, 
an infinitely holy and just God cannot allow that 
it is ultimately better for those who break His 
law, who violate His percepts, and degrade the 
nature by which they are like to Him, than for 
those who observe His commandments and con- 
form their conduct to the archetype of holiness. 

Therefore, there must be a future existence in 
which the present deficiencies of life are set right. 

Proof — 3. From the Consent of Mankind. 

Morally speaking, at all times and among all 
nations there has been found a belief in a future 
hfe. 

But such a belief and conviction, in direct op- 
position to all sensible appearances, must spring 
from man's rational nature and must be allowed 
to be true, unless we are ready to affirm that 
man's rational nature leads him inevitably into 
error. 

Therefore, we are bound to admit the trust- 
worthiness of this universal belief under penalty 
of intellectual suicide. 

Part III— God Will Not Destroy the Soul. 

Proof — God acts with wisdom in all His works. 

But, there is no wisdom in creating a being 
capable and necessarily desirous of living forever 
and then annihilating it after a time. 

Therefore God will not destroy the soul. 



154 essentials of psychology 

Article 2. The Union of Body and Soul. 

Thesis 14 — The Human Soul and Body by Their 
Union Form One Nature and One Person. 

Statement of the Question — 1. False Vietvs. 

The theories concerning the nature of man and 
the relations between body and soul may be classed 
as the dualistic and the monistic. 

The monistic theory does not allow anything 
spiritual ; the whole world is nothing else than 
matter and force. 

The modern solution of the question is called 
Psycho-physical Parallelism. It comprises three 
tents: (a) our physical life is only a series of 
states, without there being a soul-substance; (b) 
psychical acts and physiological actions are not 
the same realities; (c) there is not and cannot 
be any efficient influence of the first upon the 
second or vice versa. The best known exponent 
of this theory is Professor Wundt who stoutly 
denies the reality of substance. 

Psycho-physical parallelism, either under the 
empirical form adopted by Wundt or as a part of 
a monistic metaphysics, stands today as the only 
psychological theory opposed to the scholastic 
theory of substantial unity. 

Dualism teaches that mind and body are two 
distinct principles. False dualistic theories are 
the following: 

(a) According to Plato the rational soul is 
a pure spirit incarcerated in the body on account 
of some crime committed in a pre-natal existence. 
Its relation to the body is analogous to the relation 
of a rider to his horse or a pilot to his boat. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 155 

Refutation — 1. There is not a shred of evi- 
dence for a pre-natal existence. 

2. The doctrine of Plato would make man not 
one but two distinct beings. 

(b) Occasionalism — Occasionalism represents 
the soul and body as two opposed and distinct 
beings, between which no real interaction can take 
place naturally. It is God who effects changes 
in both. On the occasion of a modification of the 
soul He produces an appropriate movement in the 
body and vice versa. All our sensations, thoughts 
and volitions are produced by Him. 

Refutation — 1. This theory renders purpose- 
less the wonderful mechanism of the sense-organs 
and destroys the nature of the rational faculties. 

2. It is in direct conflict with the testimony of 
consciousness which tells us of our personal cau- 
sality in the exercise of volitions and self-control. 

3. Occasionalism involves the gratuitous as- 
sumption of a constant miracle. 

(c) The Theory of Pre-E stahlished Harmony. 
Leibnitz held that the soul and the body are 

entirely separated; that the soul's acts succeed 
one another and form one series, and that the 
acts of the body form another series, and that 
between these series there is no interaction. 

God in the beginning foresaw what the actions 
would be and established a harmony between the 
one series and the other. Hence the actions of 
the soul and body proceed like two clocks started 
together in a divinely pre-arranged correspond- 
ence. 



156 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The objection to this theory is the same as the 
objection mentioned above. The union between 
mind and body is accidental, and thus we have 
two beings and not one. 

2. When we say that soul and body by their 
union form one nature we mean that from their 
union results one source of operation. For, the 
nature of a being is simply its essence viewed as 
the source of its actions. 

A "suppositum" is an individual nature con- 
ceived as a complete being existing by itself and 
not communicated with another. 

The "suppositum" is, therefore, the entire and 
complete source of all operations. Hence arises 
the axiom: actions are referred to their "sup- 
posita." 

When the "suppositum" is gifted with reason, 
it is called a person. 

A person is an individual substance endowed 
with reason. 

The Soul and Body by Their Union Form. One 
Nature. 

Proof — The nature of a being is simply its 
essence viewed as the source of its operations. 

Therefore, the soul and body by their union 
form one nature, if from their union arises one 
source of operation. 

But such is the case. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — That from the union of 
body and soul a new source of operation arises 
is evident from the fact that man is capable of 
vegetative and sensitive activities. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 157 

But vegetative and sensitive activities are not 
of the soul alone nor of the body alone, but of 
the composite being. 

The Soul and Body by Their Union Form One 
Person. 

Proof — The soul and body by their union form 
one person, if by their union they form one in- 
dividual substance endowed with reason. 

But the soul and body form such an individual 
substance by their union. Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — Introspection and external 
observation establish that our vegetative, sensitive 
and rational activities have their source in and 
belong to one and the same self. The true human 
individual is neither consciousness, nor soul, nor 
body, but the complete Ego, the living rational 
being arising from the substantial union of both 
principles. 

Thesis 15 — There Is in Man One Soul Which Is 
the Substantial Form of the Body. 

Statement of the Question — 1. According to 
scholastic philosophy the soul is described as the 
substantial form of the body. According to the 
Schoolmen every being is conceived as the com- 
posite of two factors: the one active and deter- 
minant, the other determinable ; the first is called 
the form, the second primary matter. 

In every living being the vital principle is the 
form; it is the determining factor which defines 
its essential nature and from which proceed the 
activities by which the living being is separated 
from all other classes of beings. 



158 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Hence, a substantial form is defined as a de- 
termining principle which by its union with the 
subject it actuates constitutes a complete sub- 
stance of a determinate species. 

2. When we say that the human soul is the 
substantial form of the body, we assert that the 
soul, although it is an incomplete substance and 
distinct from the body, is nevertheless so united 
with the body that by this union it constitutes a 
complete substance — a human being. 

The human soul is said to be an incomplete sub- 
stance because, although it is spiritual and cap- 
lable of existing apart from the body, it has a 
natural aptitude to be united with the body to 
form one complete substance. 

3. We maintain, furthermore, that there is 
only one soul in man. Plato allotted to the hu- 
man body three distinct souls, the vegetative, the 
sensitive and the rational. 

Some modern psychologists hold that there is 
in man besides the rational soul a vital principle 
which is the source of organic life. 

Part I — There Is One Soul in Man. 

Proof — There is only one soul in man if there 
is in him a natural unity of activity. 

But there is in man a natural unity of activity. 
Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — Experience shows that 
there is in man an intimate interdependence be- 
tween the activities of the vegetative, sensitive 
and rational life. We know, for instance, that 
too much attention of the mind impedes sensation 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 159 

of sight and hearing and injures digestion. Too 
strong an exercise of the imagination affects the 
judgment and organic life. Strong emotions of 
the sensuous appetite, have an influence on the 
circulation of the blood, on thought and reason- 
ing. 

But this interdependence is inexplicable if it 
proceeds from distinct and separate principles. 
For if there were several distinct principles of 
life in man, each principle would act immanently 
and hence would not impede the action of the 
other. Immanent actions can only impede each 
other if they are rooted in one and the same 
principle. 

Part II — The Soul Is the Substantial Form of 
the Body. 

Proof — If the body had its own existence and 
the soul likewise its own, body and soul would 
necessarily be two subsisting things. 

Now, two subsisting things, no matter how 
closely they approach each other or how intimate 
be their action, ever remain two things and never 
become one substantial unit. 

Therefore, every spiritualistic theory which 
does not regard the body as first matter to which 
the soul communicates its own existence, must fail 
to account for the substantial unity of man and 
the intrinsic union of matter and mind that is to 
be found within him. 



160 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Thesis 16 — The Human Soul by Its Essence Is 
Present in the Whole Body and in All Its Parts: 
But All Its Activity Is Not Exercised in Every 
Part of the Body. 

Statement of the Question — There have been 
many discussions among philosophers, ancient and 
modern, as to the precise part of the body which 
is the seat of the soul. 

Some located it in the heart, others in the blood, 
others in the brain; (so Plato and Descartes.) 

These views seem to have arisen from the er- 
roneous opinion that simplicity of essence is a 
spatial simplicity, like that of a mathematical 
point. 

However, the simplicity of the soul does not 
consist in the minuteness of a point. The soul is 
immaterial, a substantial source of energy which, 
though not constituted of parts, is yet capable of 
informing and exercising its power throughout 
an extended subject. Such a reality does not, like 
a material entity, occupy different parts of space 
by different parts of its own mass. In scholastic 
philosophy it is described as present throughout 
the body which it informs not commensurably but 
definitely ; it is ubiquitously throughout the body. 

Part I — The Human Soul by Its Essence Is 
Present in the Whole Body and in All Its Parts. 

Proof — The soul is the substantial form of the 
body. 

But the substantial form of the body vivifies 
and actuates its entire material co-efficient so as 
to constitute with it one complete living being. 
Therefore. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 161 

Proof of the Mino7- — 1. It is only by its im- 
material presence and union with the body that 
the soul can actuate and vitalize the body. 

2. Since the soul is an indivisible spirit, 
wherever it is present it must be present by its 
essence. 

Now, the soul gives specific being to the whole 
body and to all its parts. Therefore. 

Part II — The Soul Does Not Exercise All Its 
Activity in Every Part of the Body. 

Proof — Some powers of the soul require par- 
ticular organs to perform their proper activities. 

But these organs are not in every part of the 
body. 

Therefore, the functions of the compound which 
require a special organ can evidently be exercised 
only in that part of the body where the organ is. 

Article 3. The Origin of the Human Soul. 

Thesis 17 — The Soul Is Not Begotten by the 
Parents But Created by God. 

Statement of the Question — 1. Erroneous 

Views. 

The theories regarding the origin of the soul 
may be divided into three : the theory of Emmana- 
tion, the theory of Traducianism, the theory of 
Creation. 

(a) According to the theory of Emanation the 
human soul is an emanation of the divine sub- 
stance; therefore it is part of God. This is the 
theory of the Pantheists. 



162 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

That this theory is in confKct with the sim- 
plicity and a'bsolute perfection of God is proved 
in Natural Theology. 

(b) The theory of Traducianism seeks to find 
the origin of the soul in the parents. It contends 
that the soul is transmitted to the offspring by 
the parents. The manner of propagation is vari- 
ously explained. 

(aa) Some maintained that the soul like the 
body is produced by material generation. 

(bb) Others thought that the soul came into 
being by a sort of spiritual generation, distinct 
from corporeal generation. 

Part I — The Soul Is Not Begotten by the 
Parents. 

Proof — (a) The rational soul cannot be de- 
rived from the body of the parents because a 
spiritual substance cannot be produced by a ma- 
terial element. 

(b) The derivation of the soul from the soul 
of the parents is equally untenable. For, the 
human soul is simple and immaterial. 

But a simple being has no parts and cannot, 
therefore, be split into parts. 

Part II — The Soul Is Created by God. 

Opposed to the above theories stands the theory 
of Creation. According to this doctrine each hu- 
man soul is produced by the creative power of 
God. 

Creation means the calling of a being into ex- 
istence from absolute nothingness; or, the pro- 



ESSPJNTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 163 

duction of a thing according to its whole sub- 
stance. 

Proof — Each human soul is a contingent, spirit- 
ual substance. 

But a contingent, spiritual substance cannot be 
produced except by the creative power of God. 
Therefore. 

Proof of the Minor — The material things round 
about us are the result of transformation or 
change. 

But a spiritual being, intrinsically independent 
of matter, cannot be the result of change, because 
in that case it would, like its cause, be material. 

Therefore, the soul must have originated in 
some other manner. 

But, the only way left is creation. 

WHEN IS THE HUMAN SOUL CREATED? 

Thesis 17 — The Human Soul Is Not Created Be- 
fore It Is United With the New Organism. 

Statement of the Question — Plato, Philo, Origen 
and others, believed that the human souls were 
created long before they are united with the body. 

Leibnitz thought that all the souls were created 
on the sixth day of creation and were enclosed in 
small organic bodies, ready to be evoked to ration- 
al life when the fitting conditions were supplied. 

Proof — The soul is an incomplete substance, 
naturally destined to be united with the body. 

But every opinion which maintains that the hu- 
man soul existed before the union with the body 



164 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

supposes the soul to be a complete substance only 
accidentally united with the body. Therefore. 

Moreover, the souls, before their union with 
the body, either exercised vital activity or they 
did not. If they exercised vital activity, they 
ought to retain some memory of these operations ; 
if they did not, there was no purpose in creating 
them before their union with the body. 

THE TIME WHEN THE SOUL IS UNITED 
WITH THE BODY. 

As to exact moment when the soul is united 
with body, two opinions prevail among the School- 
men. 

1. The first is the view of St. Thomas. He 
held that three souls are successively produced in 
the generation of man. 

At first the embryo is informed by the vegeta- 
tive soul. Thereupon, when through the agency 
of this vegetative soul the corporeal element has 
been more fully developed, the sensitive soul 
comes into existence and the vegetative soul re- 
cedes. The sensitive soul, in turn, perfects the 
organism so as to fit it for the reception of the 
rational soul. When the proper development has 
been reached the sensitive soul ceases and the ra- 
tional soul is created and united with the body. 
This rational soul is virtually vegetative and sen- 
sitive. 

Some modern scholastic philosophers also hold 
this view. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 165 

Reasons for This Vieic. 

(a) Nature does not operate by leaps and 
boun'ds in the production of her works. 

(b) The rational soul cannot be united with 
any sort of organism but only with a body that 
is duly developed. 

(c) Every development which follov/s after 
the human organism has been formed is called 
growth. Now, they say, every evolution of the 
human being which preceded this formation be- 
longs to the generation of the human being. But, 
the substantial form is not the principle but the 
term of generation. 

2. Other scholastic philosophers hold the view 
that the human soul is created at conception. They 
admit that the soul does not exercise all its powers 
at once, but successively as the human organism 
becomes developed for the purpose. 

Reasons for the View. 

(a) It is an acknowledged principle of phil- 
osophy that beings must not be multiplied without 
necessity. Now, there is no need for a series of 
souls in the production of the human being since 
the rational soul can effect in the development of 
the embryo whatever the inferior souls would pro- 
duce, if they alone were present. 

Wherefore, as soon as the embryo has a rudi- 
mentary organization which is sufficient for the 
exercise of vegetative life, there is a sufficient 
reason why the human soul should be created and 
united with it. 



166 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(b) According to physiologists and biologists 
the human embryo from the. start is nourished by 
organic alimentation after the manner of an an- 
imal or a grown-up person, and not by inorganic 
alimentation as is the case with plants. 

(c) No reason seems to be forthcoming to 
show why the purely vegetative soul should dis- 
pose the embryonic body for the "eduction" of the 
sensitive soul, or why the sensitive soul should 
perfect the body for the reception of the rational 
soul, which in one formative progress of the or- 
ganism exercises the vegetative and sensitive 
functions. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 167 



A SHORT LIST OF REFERENCES 



Aveling, Francis — The Immortality of the Soul. 

Barrett, E. BoyJ— Strength of Will. 

Driesch, H.--Sfionee and Philo;:(>i'liy of the Organism. 

Dubray, C. — Introductory Philosophy. 

Dwight, Dr. Thomas — Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist. 

Fell, G., S. J.— Immortality of the Soul. 

Frank, Karl — The Theory of Evolution. 

Gerard, J. — The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer. 

Gruender, H., S. J. — Freedom of the "Will. 

Gruender, H., S. J. — Psychology Without a Soul. 

Gruender, H., S. J. — Experimental Psychology. 

Haddock, Frank Channing — Power of Will. 

Husslein, J. — Evolution and Social Progress. 

James, William — Principles of Psychology. 

Loeb, J. — The Dynamics of Living Matter. 

Loeb, J. — The Mechanistic Conception of Life. 

Maher, M., S. J. — Psychology. 

Maher, M., S. J. — Life and the Conservation of Energy. 

McDougall, W. — ^Physiological Psychology. 

McDougall, W. — Animism. 

Menge, Edward J. — The Beginnings of Science. 

Mercier, Cardinal — A Manuel of Modern Scholastic Phil- 
osophy. 

Muckerm.ann, H., S. J. — Attitude of Catholics Towards 
Darwinism. 

Muckermann, H., S. J. — Humanizing of the Brute. 

McCosh — The Emotions. 

Moore, B. — Recent Advances in Physiology and Bio- 
Chemistry. 

Morgan, T. H. — The Development of the Frog's Egg. 

Morgan, T. H. — Regeneration. 

Newland, C. Bingham — What Is Instinct? (This book, 
wrong in theory, has many instances of animal ac- 
tivities.) 

Rickab^'^, Joseph, S. J. — Free Will and Four English Phil- 
osophers. 



ie8 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Shallo, M., S. J. — Scholastic Philosophy. 

Sharpe, A. B. — Freedom of Will. 

Thomson, Dr. W. H.— What Is Physical Life? 

Thomson, Dr. W. H. — Brain and Personality. 

Thorndike, E. L. — Animal Intelligence. 

Wassmann, E., S. J. — Instinct and Intelligence. 

Wassmann, E., S. J. — Modern Biology and the Theory of 

Evolution. 
Wassmann, E., S. J. — The Problem of Evolution. 
Wassmann, E., S. J. — ^Phychology of Ants and Higher 

Animals. 
Vaughan, J. S. — Life After Death. 
Windle, B. C. A.— A Century of Scientific Thought. 
Windle, B. C. A.— The Church and Science. 
Windle, B. C. A. — Facts and Theories. 
Windle, B. C. A.— The Secret of the Cell. 
Windle, B. C. A.— What Is Life? 
Winchester — Principles of Literary Criticism. 
Wilson — The Cell in Its Development and Inheritance. 
Yerkes, R. M.^The Dancing Mouse. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 169 



INDEX 

ACTIVITY, immanent, definition of, 6; nature of, 9. 

APPETENCY, definition of, 58, 108; division of, 58 ff.; 
sensitive, 59, 122; difference between sensitive appeti- 
tion and sensitive cognition, 59; organ of sensitive 
appetiition, 66 ff.; rational, 122. 

ASSOCIATION, theory of, 94, 108. 

COGNITION, definition of sensitive, 32, 34; principle of 

sensitive cognition, 36 ff. 
COGNITIONAL DETERMINANT, definition and nature 

of, 33. 
COMMON SENSE, existence, nature and object of, 45 f.; 

in animals, 72. 
COMPOSITION, chemical, in living beings, 11. 
CONCEPTUAL DETERMINANT, 116, 118. 

DARWIN, CHARLES, 23, 76. 
DETERMINISM, theories of, 129. 

EMANATION, theory of, 161. 

EMOTIONS, nature of, 62 f.; influence of, 63 f.; division 
of, 65 f. 

EVOLUTION, theories of, 25; theory of mental evolu- 
tion, 95. 

FACULTY, general definition of, 12; classification of, 12; 

rational, 85 f.; division of rational faculties, 87. 
FEOHNER, 16. 
FEELINGS, nature of, 60 f. 

GENERATION, spontaneous, 19 ff. 
GOOD, definition of, 123; division of, 124. 
GROWTH, nature of, 11, 14 f., 18. 

HERTWIG, OSKAR, 23. 
HUXLEY, THOMAS, 21, 22. 



170 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

IDEA, universal, 91 ff.; universal ideas and sensation, 
96; immaterial, abstract, 97; difference between ideas 
and sense-perception, 99, 103; erroneous theories of 
the origin of ideas, 107 ff.; scholastic theory of the 
origin of ideas, 114 ff. 

INDIFFERENCE, of will, 139; active, 140. 

IMAGINATION, definition of, 52; nature of, 53; repro- 
ductive and creative, 54 f.; in animals, 73 f. 

IMMORTALITY, definition and nature of, 149 f.; argu- 
ment for, 150 ff. 

INNATE IDEAS, theory of, 111. 

INSTINCT, nature of, 55, 77, 78; in man, 55 ff.; in an- 
imals, 74 f.; Mercier's definition of, 81 f. 

INTELLECT, nature of, 91 ff.; object of, 100 ff.; a 
spiritual faculty, 103 ff.; dependence on the organ- 
ism, 107; active and passive, 116 ff. 

INTELLIGENCE, nature of, 78; animals do not possess 
it, 80 ff. 

JAMES, WILLIAM, 94, 129, 147. 
JUDGMENT, objectively indifferent, 139 f. 

LANGUAGE, origin of, 114. 

LIBERTY, definition of, 128; elements of free action, 128; 
views regarding liberty of will, 129 f.; arguments 
for liberty of will, 130 ff.; nature of, 139 ff. 

LIFE, definition of, 5; vegetative, 14 ff.; theories of, 
19 ff.; sensitive, 31 ff. 

MAHER, MICHAEL, 69, 86. 

MATERIALISTS, view regarding organic life, 7; regard- 
ing spontaneous generation, 19 f.; regarding sensation, 
37; regarding self-consciousness, 88; in reference to 
the intellect, 104; in relation to ideas, 108; view of 
freedom of the will, 129. 

MEMORY, definition and division of, 47; retention, 48; 
recall, 48 f.; laws of, 49 ff.; recognition, 51 f.; organ 
of, 52; in animals, 73. 

MERCIER, CARDINAL, 78, 81. 

MOORE, B., 23. 

MOVEMENT, nature of, 6; spontaneous, 16; reflex, 77. 

NUTRITION, nature of, 11, 14 f., 18. 



ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 171 

OCCASIONALISM, theory of, 155. 
ONTOLOGISM, theory of, 110. 

PANPSYCHISM, theory of, 15. 

PASSION, definition and nature of, 61. 

PASTEUR, LOUIS, 22. 

PERSON, definition of, 156. 

PHANTASMS, concomitant, 92; characteristics of, 92 ff.; 

symbolic, 93, 98; in relation to universal ideas, 96 f.; 

in relation to abstract ideas, 99; in relation to the 

origin of ideas, 119 ff. 
PLATONIC IDEALISM, theory of, 109 f. 
PLEASURE, sensitive, 74. 

PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY, theory of, 155. 
PROPERTIES, of living beings, 110 f. 
PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM, theories of, 154. 
PSYCHOLOGY, definition and scope of, 3; comparative 

or animal, 69 ff.; rational, 85 ff. 

REDI, FRANCESCO, 21. 
REPRODUCTION, nature of, 14 f., 18. 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, importance of, 87; nature of, 
88; concomitant and reflex, 88 f.; objects of, 90; proof 
for the spirituality of the intellect, 106 ff. 

SENSATION, definition of, 16, 32; seat of external sen- 
sation, 40 ff.; in animals, 70 ff. 

SENSES, external, 41 ff.; internal, 43 ff.; internal senses 
in animals, 72 ff. 

SENSISM, theory of, 94, 108 ff. 

SIMPLICITY, nature of, 146 f.; of the soul, 147 ff. 

SOUL, definition of, 142; substantial principle, 142 f.; 
its spirituality, 143 f.; simplicity of, 147 ff.; immortal- 
ity of, 149 f.; union with the body, 154 ff.; oneness 
of, 157 ff.; creation of, 161 f.; time of union with the 
body, 164 ff. 

SPEECH, nature of and requirements for, 79 f. 

SPENCER, HERBERT, 23. 

SUBSTANTIAL FORM, definition of, 158; soul is sub- 
stantial form of the body, 159 f. 

TRADITIONALISM, theory of, 112 ff. 
TRADUCIANISM, theory of, 162. 



172 ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

TYNDALL, JOHN, 23. 

VALLISNIERL ANTONIO, 21. 

VIRCHOW, RUDOLPH, 23, 24. 

VITAL PRINCIPLE, definition of, 8; nature of, in plants, 
26 ff.; in animals, 83 f.; classification of, 26; sub- 
stantial form, 28; divisibility of, 29 f.; oneness of 
vital principle in animals, 82 ff. 

WASMANN, ERIC, 69, 78. 

WILL, definition of, 122; object of, 123, 125 ff.; superior 

to sensitive appetency, 124 ff.; freedom of, 126 ff.; 

arguments for freedom of the will, 130 ff.; control 

of the will over the other faculties, 136; will and 

intellect, 136 f.; will and evil, 137 f. 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent; Magnesium Oxide 
Treatnnent Date: Oct. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township. PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



